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I. INTRODUCTION
There can hardly be a better time to make the case for economic and financial
literacy than right now… [W]e face a downturn… fueled, at least in part, by
unwise mortgage borrowing… [A] better informed citizenry would likely have
resulted in more-prudent decision making and… less harm to the economy.
– Federal Reserve Board Governor Frederic
1
S. Mishkin, February 2008
Financial literacy provides the foundation to build wealth and fully participate in
the economy…. By understanding basic financial principles and putting them to
use, you can be on the road to improving the lives of your household and your
community…
– NAACP Financial Empowerment Guide2
[T]here needs to be financial education measures in place.
– President George W. Bush, regarding home
mortgage foreclosure rates, August 20073
Although the cry for financial literacy education has been audible for decades, the
volume has recently increased.4 Why? Technological advances allowing industry to
create and profit from more complex and riskier financial products offered to a broader
array of people, in conjunction with political dominance of an ideology favoring
deregulation, have dramatically altered this marketplace. This consumer finance
revolution has given Americans more apparent choices and formal control over their
personal credit, insurance, and retirement planning decisions. But with this choice and
control comes added responsibility to make financial decisions well, or face potentially
disastrous health and welfare results.
As the SEC’s Division of Investment Management Director put it: “[A]n era of selfreliance has begun. Today we stand at what may be a defining moment in American
economic history, as more and more of us are taking responsibility for our own
retirement needs.”5 Although defined benefit pension plans once covered many workers,
most retirement plans today, when offered at all, are defined contribution, requiring
individuals to decide how much to save and how to invest.6 Similarly, employersponsored health insurance has declined, leaving more Americans to find their own
policies.7 As for credit, lenders once required evidence of sufficient income, given
1

Frederic S. Mishkin, Fed. Res. Bd. of Governors, Speech before the Third National Summit on Economic
and Financial Literacy: The Importance of Economic Education and Financial Literacy (Feb. 27, 2008).
2
NAACP
Financial
Empowerment
Guide
4
&
5
(2003),
available
at
http://www.naacp.org/pdfs/finance_fei.pdf (last visited Feb. 10, 2008).
3
Remarks by the President in Roundtable Interview with Business Reporters (Aug. 8, 2007), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/08/09/AR2007080900780_pf.html.
4
In pursuit of the creation of a “nation of economic literates,” the first National Conference on Consumer
Education was held in 1939. See Leland J. Gordon, Review: Next Steps in Consumer Education, Proceedings
of a National Conference on Consumer Education, 6 S. ECON. J. 403 (1940). In the last decade, promotion of
financial literacy education has proliferated. See Jump$tart Coalition, Financial Literacy: Improving
Education, 2006 National Jump$tart Coalition Survey, Executive Summary at 1.
5
Paul Roye, Protecting Pension Plan Participants Through Investor Education, Keynote Address Before the
International Foundation of Employee Benefit Plans (May 9, 2000), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/spch369.htm.
6
See, e.g., GAO, EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH AND RETIREMENT BENEFITS GAO-07-355 at 28-31 (Mar.
2007) (describing move from defined benefit to defined contribution plans); id. at 38 fig.4 (22% of full-time
workers and 62% of part-time or seasonal workers are not offered employer-sponsored retirement benefits).
7
Id. at 17 & 18 Tbl. 1 (reporting declines in both the percentage of workers covered by employer-sponsored
health plans and the percentage of employers offering health benefits between 2001 and 2005).
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consumers’ financial obligations, to afford their mortgages. Today’s lenders offer loans
requiring little or no documentation, so consumers must determine for themselves what
payments they can afford, or risk losing their homes.8
Seller disclosure and largely unfettered consumer choice is the dominant model of
regulation in the U.S. for credit, insurance, and investment products. As these products
have become more complex and the consequences of consumers’ inability to understand
them more dire, financial literacy education is a necessary corollary to the disclosure
model. This education is widely believed to turn consumers into “responsible” and
“empowered” market players, motivated and competent to handle their own credit,
insurance, savings, and investment matters by confidently navigating the bountiful
unrestricted marketplace. This vision, which promises both a free market and increased
consumer welfare, seduces conservatives and liberals alike.
This vision depends on the belief that financial literacy education can not only
improve decisions, but can do so to the degree necessary for consumers to protect and
even increase their welfare in the modern financial marketplace.9 But what evidence
supports this belief? Given what is known about the marketplace and human
decisionmaking, how plausible is the belief? What are the costs of financial regulation
through education and are these costs commensurate with the benefits it reasonably could
be expected to provide? Is there any alternative but to pursue financial literacy?
A prior article demonstrated that belief in the effectiveness of financial literacy
education lacks empirical support.10 This article argues that the belief is implausible.
The gulf between the literacy levels of most Americans and that required to assess the
plethora of credit, insurance, and investment products sold today—and new products as
they are invented tomorrow—cannot realistically be bridged. Educators would need to
impart a sophisticated understanding of finance because rules of thumb are not useful for
decisions about complex products in a volatile market. Further, high financial literacy
can be necessary for good financial decisionmaking, but is not sufficient; heuristics,
biases, and emotional coping mechanisms that interfere with welfare-enhancing personal
finance behaviors are unlikely to be eradicated through education, particularly in a
dynamic market. To the contrary, the advantage in resources with which to reach
consumers that financial services firms enjoy puts firms in a better position to capitalize
on decisionmaking biases than educators who seek to train consumers out of them.
Harboring this belief may be innocent, but it is not harmless; the pursuit of financial
literacy poses costs that almost certainly swamp any benefits. For some consumers,
financial education appears to increase confidence without improving ability, potentially
leading to worse decisions. When consumers find themselves in dire financial straits, the
8

Compare David Listokin et al., Fannie Mae Foundation, The Potential and Limitations of Mortgage
Innovation in Fostering Homeownership in the United States 27-36 & tbls 6 & 7 (2002) (listing historical
loan, borrower, and property underwriting characteristics), with Ending Mortgage Abuse: Safeguarding
Homebuyers: Hrg. Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. (2007)
(testimony of Michael D. Calhoun, Center for Responsible Lending) (more than a third of loans in a sample
of 2007 mortgage backed securities offerings lacked documentation of borrower income).
9
Although beyond the scope of this article, another predicate belief is that poor financial outcomes are to a
significant extent the result of illiteracy, independent of income or wealth. For critiques of this belief, see,
e.g., A. Mechele Dickerson, Can Shame, Guilt, or Stigma Be Taught? Why Credit-Focused Debtor Education
May Not Work, 32 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 945, 958-59 (1999) (noting financial education will not help someone
propelled into bankruptcy by job loss, medical expenses, or divorce); Angela C. Lyons et al., Translating
Financial Education into Behavior Change for Low-Income Populations, 17 FIN. COUNSELING & PLAN. 27,
41 (2006) (“It may be that some individuals, because of their particular financial situation, are unable to
change certain financial behaviors no matter how much financial education they receive.”); Katherine Porter
& Deborah Thorne, The Failure of Bankruptcy’s Fresh Start, 92 CORNELL L. REV. 67, 70 (2006) (finding
insufficient income, not financial mismanagement, is key barrier to long-term financial health).
10
Lauren E. Willis, Evidence and Ideology in Assessing the Effectiveness of Financial Literacy Education
(Jan. 2008).
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regulation through education model blames them for their plight, shaming them and
deflecting calls for effective market regulation. Requiring consumers to act as their own
financial experts is socially inefficient. Opportunity costs should not be overlooked; a
single-minded focus on financial education inhibits pursuit of other policy tools for
improving the financial welfare of Americans.
This article proceeds as follows: Part II summarizes my prior work finding no
reliable empirical evidence that financial literacy programs are effective. Part III
explains why it is implausible that this education could teach consumers how to make
welfare-enhancing decisions about credit, insurance, and investments. Part IV exposes
some of the costs of pursuing financial regulation through consumer education. Part V
suggests alternative policy tools that could be effective, given the complexity and fluidity
of the consumer financial marketplace.
II. DOES FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION WORK?11
Financial literacy education is conducted through classroom teaching, self-study
materials, informational websites, interactive games, and the educational component of
one-on-one counseling. Programs vary in content, audience, and methodology. But they
all aim to achieve welfare-enhancing behavior engaged in as the result of acquired
financial literacy.
The cognitive components of this literacy include “being
knowledgeable, educated, and informed on the issues of managing money and assets,
banking, investments, credit, insurance, and taxes” and “understanding the basic concepts
underlying the management of money and assets (e.g., the time value of money in
investments and the pooling of risks in insurance).”12
Turning cognitive literacy into positive action requires a well-calibrated degree of
confidence—neither underconfidence13 nor overconfidence.14 Consumers’ beliefs about
the efficacy of their own financial decisionmaking must match the actual and perceived
difficulty of the decision at hand. Overconfident consumers are unlikely to ask for help
when they need it and will spend too little time and effort on financial decisions.
Underconfident consumers tend to shy away from engaging in the information search,
planning, and calculations that good financial decisions require.15
Ultimately, financial literacy education is only effective if it enables consumers,
given their resource constraints, to make the decisions and take the actions necessary for
financial well-being today.16 Effectiveness must be measured against the decisions and
actions our society and marketplace require. Diagramed, the financial literacy education
policy model appears:

Although routinely cited by policymakers, industry, literacy advocates, and even
academics,17 studies claiming to find support for the financial literacy model suffer a
11

This section summarizes my prior critique of the existing empirical research. See id.
Jeanne M. Hogarth, Financial Literacy and Family and Consumer Sciences, 94 J. FAMILY & CONSUMER
SCI. 14, 15 (2002).
13
See, e.g., Lois A. Vitt et al., Personal Finance and the Rush to Competence: Financial Literacy Education
in the U.S. 29-35 (Fannie Mae Found. 2000).
14
See, e.g., Brad M. Barber & Terrance Odean, Trading is Hazardous to Your Wealth: The Common Stock
Investment Performance of Individual Investors, 55 J. FIN. 773, 791 (2000).
15
See Jing Hu et al., The Relationship Between Task Complexity and Information Search: The Role of SelfEfficacy, 24 PSYCHOL. & MARKETING 253, 265 (2007).
16
See, e.g., National Endowment for Financial Education, Closing the Gap Between Knowledge and
Behavior—Turning Education into Action (Denver, CO, Aug. 10-12, 2005).
17
See, e.g., A Bill to Promote Youth Financial Education, Senate Bill 925, 109th Cong., 1st Sess. (2005);
Ben S. Bernanke, Increasing Economic Opportunity: Challenges and Strategies, Remarks at the Fifth
Regional Issues Conf. of the Fifteenth Cong. Dist. of Texas (June 13, 2006); Howell E. Jackson & Stacy A.
12
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variety of fatal weaknesses. First, many use data collection techniques biased toward
finding that this education is effective. Most rely on participant self-assessments of
whether the course changed their own knowledge, confidence, and behaviors.18 But
people overestimate how much they have learned and how much their future behavior
will change.19 Data from follow-up surveys suffer from a similar bias because
participants are likely, intentionally or unconsciously, to overstate the extent to which
they are behaving as they were taught they should.20 High nonrandom nonresponse rates
similarly skew the data—those who think they have changed their behavior are likely to
be the most eager to report it, and those who do not are less likely to respond.21
Attempting to connect current financial condition with respondent self-reports of having
learned from past classes or seminars introduces potential recall bias—people who have
experienced good financial outcomes are more likely to think they “learned” from a class
and to remember having taken one at all.22
Second, because programs often bundle direct assistance with education, outcomes
may be attributable to the assistance rather than the education.23 Assistance can include
financial rewards, lowered payments, or special loan programs.24 Credit counselors can
intervene with creditors, lenders, or credit bureaus on behalf of the participant, give the
consumer rote assignments (e.g., “do not sign for this loan because I have determined you
cannot afford it”), or impose self-control devices.25 Changes in participants after the
Anderson, Can States Tax National Banks to Educate Consumers About Predatory Lending Practices?, 30
HARVARD J.L. & PUBLIC POL’Y 831, n.__ (2007).
18
For a study using participant self-assessments to evaluate financial education, see Sharon M. Danes,
Evaluation of the National Endowment for Financial Education High School Financial Planning Program
(2004).
19
In one study, consumers who attended retirement-related financial classes thought their literacy had
increased, but their scores on financial tests did not. Douglas A. Hershey et al., Challenges of Training PreRetirees to Make Sound Financial Planning Decisions, 24 EDUC. GERONTOLOGY 447, 467 (1998). In
another, employees who reported at the end of a retirement investing seminar they would increase their
savings generally failed to do so. James Choi et al., Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance
308, in BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE (Ed McCaffrey & Joel Slemrod eds. 2006).
20
See, e.g., Roger Tourangeau & Ting Yan, Sensitive Questions in Surveys, 133 PSYCHOL. BULL. 859, 875-76
& 877 (2007). One study of financial education using consumer self-reports of savings admits that
“education may affect reporting, rather than behavior.” B. Douglas Bernheim & Daniel M. Garrett, The
Effects of Financial Education in the Workplace: Evidence From a Survey of Households, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
1487, 1489 (2003).
21
See, e.g., Angela C. Lyons et al., Are We Making the Grade? A National Overview of Financial Education
and Program Evaluation, 40 J. CONSUMER AFF. 208, 218-19 (2006).
22
For a study relying on respondent recall of exposure to financial education, see Marsha J. Courchane &
Peter M. Zorn, Consumer Literacy and Creditworthiness, Fed. Res. Sys. Comm. Affs Res. Conf. (Apr. 2004).
23
See Jean Braucher, An Empirical Study of Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: Impact on Chapter 13
Completion Not Shown, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 557, 574-75 (2001) (finding positive effect of
bankruptcy debtor education disappeared after controlling for easier repayment plans and other assistance).
24
For a study without controls for cash assistance, see Mark Schreiner et al., Savings and Asset Accumulation
in Individual Development Accounts, Washington, DC: Fed. Res. Sys. Comm. Affs Res. Conf. (Apr. 2001).
25
See, e.g., ALAN MALLACH, HOME OWNERSHIP EDUCATION AND COUNSELING: ISSUES IN RESEARCH AND
DEFINITION 11 (2001), available at http://www.philadelphiafed.org/cca/capubs/homeowner.pdf (“[S]ome of
those involved … believe that the most effective aspect … is not the counseling itself but the act of
intervention [by the counselor] with the lender.”); Abdighani Hirad & Peter M. Zorn, A Little Knowledge Is a
Good Thing: Empirical Evidence of the Effectiveness of Pre-Purchase Homeownership Counseling, in LOWINCOME HOMEOWNERSHIP: EXAMINING THE UNEXAMINED GOAL 147 (Nicolas Retsinas & Eric Belsky, eds.
2002) (explaining that their finding that classroom homeownership education was effective but self-study and
telephone counseling were not could reflect individualized teacher directions to participants). Although the
directive to close accounts is common, see Jinhee Kim et al., Relationships Among Credit Counseling
Clients’ Financial Well-being, Financial Behaviors, Financial Stressor Events, and Health, 14 FIN.
COUNSELING & PLAN., 75, 77 (2003) (“The first requirement for credit counseling clients is to cut up all their
credit cards and close the accounts.”), one frequently-cited study claims that a reduction in open accounts is
evidence that financial education is effective, see Gregory E. Elliehausen et al., The Impact of Credit
Counseling on Subsequent Borrower Behavior, 41 J. CONSUMER AFF. 1, 27 (2007).
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education could be due to these types of assistance, which are potential policy tools for
improving consumer welfare but are not financial literacy education.
A third problem is self-selection bias introduced because participation in financial
education is usually voluntary. Researchers generally cannot randomize citizens into
treatment and control groups. Individuals who choose to attend personal finance classes
may be better informed or more motivated, may have more free time for researching and
making financial decisions, may possess personalities more conducive to welfareenhancing financial behavior, or may experience less embarrassment or denial due to
fewer past financial problems.26
The improved financial outcomes sometimes
experienced by consumers who receive education may reflect that the same factors that
led them to participate in the education would have led them to engage in welfareenhancing financial behavior regardless.27
Putting aside methodological weaknesses, the improvements that have been claimed
have been far shy of the financial literacy education model’s goal. Some investigations
have found that personal finance courses increase confidence,28 but this may reflect
overconfidence, not the accurate degree of confidence in one’s own knowledge and skills
needed for good financial behaviors. Studies based on testing attribute less than a single
additional correct answer, on average, to participation in financial literacy education.29
The questions, moreover, are inadequate to demonstrate whether even a high scorer could
make welfare-enhancing decisions in today’s marketplace. Some are factual—for
example, whether annual returns on a diversified U.S. stock mutual fund “can be
expected” to average 5%, 10%, 15%, 20%, or 25%; others specify the figures with which
calculations must be performed—for example, whether someone with income of $2000
and expenses of $800 for rent and $200 for groceries who spends another $700 each
month will need 1, 2, 3, or 4 months to save $900.30 As discussed further below, the
policymakers who embrace regulation through financial literacy education expect
educated consumers to be able to do far more, and in an environment in which the
answers are not multiple-choice.
Finally, it is revealing that industry universally supports financial literacy programs
even though customers who exercise welfare-enhancing personal financial behaviors are
less profitable. Credit card issuers obtain about 80 percent of their revenues from finance
charges and penalty fees, and, therefore, earn more on accounts that pay late, exceed
credit limits, and/or do not pay off balances each month than they do on accounts that
produce only merchant fees.31 When consumers engage in better financial behavior, the
net effect on the issuer is a decrease in card issuer profits.32 Investment firms derive
26
See, e.g., Stephan Meier & Charles Sprenger, Selection into Financial Literacy Programs, Federal Reserve
Bank of Boston Discussion Paper No. 07-5 (Nov. 2007). (finding that consumers with more education, more
financial knowledge, and lower financial discount rates were more likely to accept an offer of a brief, free,
credit counseling session).
27
For a study without controls for self-selection, see, e.g., E. Thomas Garman et al., Workplace Financial
Education Improves Personal Financial Wellness, 10 FIN COUNSELING & PLAN. 79 (1999).
28
See, e.g., U.S. Department of Agriculture, Cooperative State Research, Education, and Extension Service,
Financial
Security
in
Later
Life
Impact
Report,
available
at
http://www.csrees.usda.gov/nea/economics/pdfs/fsll_impacts_jan06.pdf.
29
See, e.g., Tzu-Chin Martina Peng et al., The Impact of Personal Finance Education Delivered in High
School and College Courses, 28 J. FAM. & ECON. ISSUES 265 (2007); Richard L. Weiner et al., Debtor
Education, Financial Literacy, and Pending Bankruptcy Legislation, 23 BEHAV. SCI. & THE LAW 347 (2005);
Sharon Tennyson & C. Chau Nguyen, State Curriculum Mandates and Student Knowledge of Personal
Finance. 35 J. CONSUMER AFF. 241 (2001).
30
The first question is from the National Association of Securities Dealers investment knowledge test and the
second is from the Jump$tart Coalition’s 2006 National Financial Literacy survey of high school seniors.
31
GAO, CREDIT CARDS: INCREASED COMPLEXITY IN RATES AND FEES HEIGHTENS NEED FOR MORE EFFECTIVE
DISCLOSURES TO CONSUMERS, GAO-06-929 at 67 (Sept. 2006).
32
When consumers charge less and do not incur late fees, card issuers lose more in interest and fees than they
would have lost due to charge-offs of uncollectible debts from consumers with poorer financial habits.
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higher profits from the sale of funds that generate higher management fees, although
consumers are better off with indexed or other low fee funds.33 Insurers similarly benefit
from policies that cost more and cover less.34 Yet these firms uniformly support financial
literacy initiatives, both rhetorically and with multi-million dollar donations.35 Even
payday lenders and check-cashers are on the bandwagon; the mission of their trade group
includes “[i]mprov[ing] consumer protections through education, disclosure and
transparency in all financial transactions.”36 So too debt collectors, who are launching an
internet-based personal financial management course even though they only make money
37
That industry supports financial
when consumers fail to pay their debts on time.
literacy education is, while indirect, perhaps the strongest evidence that this education is
38
not effective in improving consumer financial decisions.
III. IS FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION LIKELY TO WORK?
If financial literacy education’s effectiveness as a policy tool cannot be empirically
validated, one response might be that educators just have not found the right way to
educate people. But is it plausible that financial literacy programs would work?
Examining the skills and biases with which consumers currently operate and the structure
and offerings of today’s largely unregulated financial services marketplace, the prospects
for financial education as an effective policy tool are bleak.
A. Information Asymmetries and Chasing Moving Targets
The consumer financial products available in today’s marketplace are bountiful,
manifold, and dynamic. As the National Strategy for Financial Literacy explains:
Personal financial management is an extremely complex matter that requires
significant resources and commitment by consumers to understand and evaluate
the multitude of products available in the broad financial services market….
[T]he marketplace is constantly changing, with new products, services, and
providers emerging to meet consumer demand. As a result, the range of topics
and issues that consumers must evaluate is vast and ever-growing.39
Information asymmetry between sellers and consumers is inherent in such a market. Not
only do sellers have access to more information and resources to analyze it, but by the
Kimberly Gartner & Richard M. Todd, Effectiveness of Online “Early Intervention” Financial Education for
Credit Cardholders, Fed. Res. Bank of Chicago Proceedings 12 (Apr 2005).
33
Although investor education instructs consumers to minimize mutual fund fees, fund advertisements rarely
mention them. Bruce A Huhmann & Nalinaksha Bhattacharyya, Does Mutual Fund Advertising Provide
Necessary Investment Information?, 23 INT’L J. BANK MKTG. 296, 305 (2005).
34
See David Dietz & Darrell Preston, Home Insurers’ Secret Tactics Cheat Fire Victims, Hike Profits,
BLOOMBERG.COM, Aug. 3, 2007 (reporting increasing numbers of coverage exclusions, systematic
underpayment, denial, and postponements of claim payouts, and record home insurer profits).
35
See, e.g., Allstate Community Commitment website, National Programs webpage, available at
http://www.allstate.com/Community/PageRender.asp?Page=natprogs.html (announcing spending $1.3
million in 2005 on financial and economic literacy); Consumer Bankers Assoc., 2005 Survey of BankSponsored Financial Literacy Programs 11 (Apr. 2005) (documenting that in 2005 JP Morgan Chase allotted
$50 million to financial literacy and home buyer education programs).
36
Press Release, Coalition for Financial Choice Advocates for Basic Rights in Financial Services for All
Consumers (Jan. 9, 2007), available at www.coalitionforfinancialchoice.org.
37
David Streitfeld, Debt Collectors Try to Put on a Friendlier Face, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 14, 2008.
38
Cf. Jean Braucher, Debtor Education in Bankruptcy: The Perspective of Interest Analysis, in CONSUMER
BANKRUPTCY IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 319, 337-39 (Johanna Niemi-Kiesilainen et al. eds., 2003). Braucher
details creditor support for bankruptcy education programs, which are funded from payments that otherwise
would be distributed to creditors and which, if efficacious, would reduce demand for high-cost credit. She
suggests that creditors expect these programs to have “no effect on behavior” but to “deliver the rhetorical
advantage of emphasizing debtor responsibility, but without an impact on the bottom line.” Id. at 339.
39
U.S. FINANCIAL LITERACY AND EDUCATION COMMISSION, TAKING OWNERSHIP OF THE FUTURE: THE
NATIONAL STRATEGY FOR FINANCIAL LITERACY vii (2006) [hereinafter, TAKING OWNERSHIP].
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time the latest insurance, credit, or investment developments filter through educators to
consumers, the marketplace will have changed. Outdated lessons may be not only
irrelevant, but counterproductive. Financial literacy education is chasing a moving target
it will never reach.
Technological change—specifically, advances in data collection, storage, and
processing—has revolutionized the ability of the financial services industry to model
behavior to more accurately forecast each consumer’s future profitability and the risks of
each transaction.40 Insurers, lenders, and investment companies now have the capacity to
take millions of data points mined from past consumers, feed them into a multivariate
model, and generate a constantly updated predictive tool that, although imperfect, is more
accurate and more sensitive to the interactions among variables than human judgment.
Each small change in one variable can be met by a change in another variable, resulting
in a constant expected return to the seller. For example, credit can be priced according to
risk rather than rationed. Life insurers can compensate for a consumer’s refusal to
undergo a medical examination, which might have led to a per se rejection in the past, by
increasing the policy price or decreasing the expected payout.41
Computer-driven modeling allows financial firms to develop an array of niche
offerings, each consisting of a cocktail of terms.42 Each product is theoretically
responsive to the needs of different consumer segments, yet the complexity and
proliferation of new products impairs consumers’ ability to identify which products are
appropriate for them. For example, seniors are offered over 50 Medicare drug plans in
almost every state, some so complex that over 30 pages are needed to explain annual
changes in costs and benefits.43 A single defined contribution retirement plan might
contain dozens of investment funds, each requiring its own novella-length prospectus to
explain its holdings and operations.44 Credit cards carry multiple rates for various
balances, each of these rates can be variable, and issuers can reset each rate monthly.45
As a result, products are sold to consumers outside the niche for which the products
were ostensibly developed. For example, loans structured to have low monthly payments
followed by larger monthly payments—called “2/28” or “exploding” adjustable rate
mortgages (ARMs) because payments spike up after a typically two-year teaser period—
are useful for those with incomes scheduled to increase sharply or expenses expected to
decrease sharply, such as a medical student in a residency or a purchaser of a home
needing renovations. Nonetheless, as a 2005 article in The American Banker explained,
“mortgages with the potential for severe payment shocks … once considered niche
products” are now sold to households that do not expect an income or expense change.46
In June 2007, federal banking regulators instructed institutions selling these ARMs to
evaluate the repayment ability of consumers with poor credit histories using the higher,
future monthly payment, but did not restrict sale of these loans to only consumers for

40

For a fuller explanation, see Lauren E. Willis, Decisionmaking and the Limits of Disclosure: The Problem
of Predatory Lending: Price, 65 MD. L. REV. 101, 109-11 (2006).
41
See, e.g., Linda Koco, Innovation With Riders—And Without, 109 NAT’L UNDERWRITER: LIFE & HEALTH
37, 37 (2005).
42
See, e.g., id.; Meg Fletcher, Shifting Markets Demand Cutting-Edge Ideas, 41 BUS. INS. A18 (June 18,
2007).
43
Kaiser Family Foundation, Medicare Part D Plan Characteristics 2007, Medicare Fact Sheet at 1 (Nov. 10,
2006); Robert Pear, Drug Plan Companies Failed to Tell of Changes, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2006 at A18.
44
Gur Huberman & Wei Jiang, Offering vs. Choice by 401(k) Plan Participants: Equity Exposure and
Number of Funds, 61 J. FIN. 763, 763 & 768 n.3 (2006) (finding that among plans administered by Vanguard
the number of funds offered varied between 4 and 59 and the median number offered was 13).
45
See GAO, CREDIT CARDS, supra note__, at 14-15.
46
Jody Shenn, Mortgage Risk Debate Heating Up, AM. BANKER, May 5, 2005, at 1.
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whom they were designed. The one hypothetical example the regulators provided
assumes consumers accepting these loans will not have an income or expense change.47
Consumers today can invest in vehicles developed for sophisticated investors. The
latest “in a growing lineup of new investment products”48 combines risky investments
with derivatives to hedge exposure and promises the individual an opportunity to earn
returns previously only available to institutional investors in hedge funds. In unveiling
the product in August 2007, the managing director of Deutsche Bank’s retail unit
described it as a “simple solution” that employs an “easily accessible” strategy. Yet
during this same time period sophisticated investors were claiming they did not
understand derivative products they had purchased in the mortgage securities market.49
These niche offerings are ever-changing, with fresh products regularly replacing
existing products in the personal finance version of planned obsolescence. To stay
competitive—and thereby outpacing regulation—consumer financial product innovation
has become institutionalized as “product lifecycle management.”50 For example, in 2007
the mortgage lender Ditech began selling a product that integrates a home mortgage with
a home equity line and a credit card account, making household equity almost entirely
liquid.51 Another recent invention is the medical credit card, offered by hospital chains
and health maintenance organizations to consumers to pay for medical bills. A typical
card allows users to charge up to $5,000 of medical debts, with a 9 percent interest rate
during the first year and a 23 percent interest rate for balances then remaining.52 Generalpurpose credit cards are perhaps the most volatile financial product because an issuer can
change terms unilaterally on 15 days notice, enabling sellers to change the product
consumers have already bought rather than selling them new products.53
Insurance products might appear to be less fluid, given that state approval is needed
before they are sold.54 Nevertheless, the industry’s priority today is bringing new
products through the regulatory process to market more quickly. The National
Association of Insurance Companies promotes this agenda thus:
[The] Speed to Market initiative not only benefits regulators and insurers through
the streamlining of the rate and form filing process, but ultimately, benefits
consumers, ensuring that our constituents have insurance available to them
through a wealth of products that effectively meet individual needs.55
Even without new products, policies can be customized with a host of riders, allowing
insurers to go “deeper into the insurance design frontier” without the time and expense of
bringing a new product to market. These riders are not mere variations on older wellknown products; they are “next-generation” riders, so unique companies file for patent
protection on them.56
47

Final Interagency Statement on Subprime Mortgage Lending, 72 Fed. Reg. 37,569 & n. 23 (July 10, 2007).
Chidem Kurdas, Deutsche Offers Portable Alpha to the Masses, HEDGEWORLD DAILY NEWS, Aug. 10,
2007, at 1.
49
See, e.g., Alan S. Binder, Six Fingers of Blame in the Mortgage Mess, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 30, 2007, at C34.
50
Fletcher, supra note__, at A18. Cf. Henry T.C. Hu, Swaps, The Modern Process of Financial Innovation
and the Vulnerability of a Regulatory Paradigm, 138 U. PA. L. REV. 333, 340 (1989) (making similar
observation about corporate finance products).
51
PR Newswire, Ditech Real Life Plan Empowers Customers with Package of Home Finance Solutions (May
21, 2007), available at http://www.prnewswire.com.
52
Daniel Costello, Hospital Bills—But with Interest, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 12, 2005, at F1.
53
Examining the Billing, Marketing, and Disclosure Practices of the Credit Card Industry, and Their Impact
on Customers: Hrg. Before the S. Comm. on Banking, Housing, & Urban Affairs, 110th Cong. 6-7 (2007)
(testimony of Elizabeth Warren, Leo Gottlieb Professor of Law, Harvard Law School).
54
44 CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM INSURANCE § 298 (2007).
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The velocity of change in the marketplace means regulators are perpetually
struggling to keep up, and regulations—once they are vetted politically and have survived
notice and comment—are designed for a market gone by. “Information lag”57 affects the
government’s ability to regulate these financial products substantively, as well as its
ability to understand the products well enough to educate people about them. Ironically,
the same complexity and fluidity preventing individuals from making good financial
decisions may induce regulators to proclaim reliance on education so that consumers,
theoretically, will protect themselves.58 Education is a policy tool requiring consumers to
be their own regulators in a domain in which even professional regulators have difficulty.
The “option” or “pick-a-payment” ARM provides a case study. These mortgages
permit borrowers to choose each month among various payment options, which typically
include a fully amortizing principal and interest payment, an interest-only payment, and a
negative amortization payment that results in capitalized unpaid interest. These payment
options are periodically recast to reflect outstanding principal. The less-than-fullyamortizing payment option ends when the principal reaches an amount set by the lender
to protect its collateral.59 This product is appropriate for the few individuals who use the
options to handle highly fluctuating income or expenses but can afford the payments over
the long haul.60 When option ARMs are sold to those who cannot afford more than the
minimum monthly payment, the end of the negative amortization option causes the
monthly payment due to spike, putting the borrowers into default and foreclosure.61
Although option ARMs were developed as a cash management tool, in 2003 the
Comptroller of the Currency acknowledged that these mortgages were being “mass
marketed as ‘affordability products’”62 to homeowners who, month after month, made
only minimum payments.63 In 2005, a third of U.S. home mortgage originations were
option ARMs.64 That same year, option ARMs were defaulting at an alarming rate.65
Thus, federal regulators knew no later than 2003 the product was being sold
predominately outside its appropriate niche, and knew it was causing serious defaults by
2005 at the latest. However, the first federal agency consumer education material even
mentioning option ARMs was not published until October 2006.66
In September 2007, Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson responded to criticism
of the government’s failure to act to prevent the home foreclosure crisis by explaining
57

Hu, supra note__, at 406 (describing admission by IRS officer: “financial markets have been inventing new
products faster than the Internal Revenue Service can keep up with”).
58
Cf., Toni Williams, Empowerment of Whom and for What? Financial Literacy Education and the New
Regulation of Consumer Financial Services, 28 LAW & POL’Y 226, 233 & 240 (2007) (suggesting financial
education “reliev[es] regulators of some of their responsibility for the state of the market” and can be used to
“manage the risk of blame for regulatory failure”).
59
BD. OF GOVERNORS OF THE FED. RESERVE, INTEREST-ONLY MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND PAYMENT-OPTION
ARMS: ARE THEY FOR YOU? (Nov. 27, 2006) [hereinafter, OPTION ARM HANDBOOK].
60
Remarks by John C. Dugan, Comptroller of the Currency, Before the Consumer Federation of America 9
(Dec. 1, 2005).
61
Kenneth R. Harney, Payment Spikes Might Gore Those with ARMs, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 20, 2006, at K14.
62
Dugan, supra note__, at 10.
63
On more than 70% of option ARMs outstanding in 2005-06, homeowners were making only the minimum
payment. Mara Der Hovanesian, Nightmare Mortgages, BUSINESSWEEK, Sept. 11, 2006.
64
Id.; Kenneth R. Harney, Banks Warned They Must Scale Back on Payment Option Mortgage, S.F. CHRON.,
Dec. 11, 2005, at K12.
65
Defaults were so high in 2005 that ratings agencies started requiring credit enhancements for securities
backed by option ARMs. See Remarks by Federal Reserve Governor Susan Schmidt Bies (Oct. 12, 2005),
available at http:// www.federalreserve.gov/BoardDocs/Speeches/2005/200510122/default.htm.
66
Press Release, http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2006/pr06093.html (Nov. 27, 2006). The brochure
does not answer the question posed in its title, “Payment-Option ARMs: Are They for You?” Instead, it
explains how option ARMs work and leaves consumers to regulate the market for themselves. OPTION ARM
HANDBOOK, supra note__.
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that “[h]istory says it’s very difficult for policy to keep up with innovation.”67 The
following month, Secretary Paulson went further, stating not only that “innovation often
outpaces regulation,” but that “we would not want it the other way around.”68 By March
2008, with the economy diving into recession, he admitted that “regulation needs to catch
69
up with innovation.”
If the regulators cannot or do not want to keep up, educators are in no position to do
so. One investigation found erroneous information being taught at the financial
education courses that consumers who declare bankruptcy are required to take.70 The
answers to some financial literacy tests appear to be flawed, raising the suspicion that the
material taught is too.71 With industry always at least one step ahead, there is “‘an
enormous disconnect between the educational and informational needs of Americans and
the programs and information provided by the government and financial literacy
advocates.’”72
B. Insurmountable Knowledge, Comprehension, and Numeric Skill Limitations
The knowledge, comprehension, and skills necessary to make independent, welfareenhancing decisions in today’s personal financial marketplace are prodigious. Decisions
about credit, insurance, and investments require, e.g., knowledge of concepts and
terminology; extraction of information from text; understanding of arithmetic
calculations; comprehension of fractions, percentages, and probabilities; predictions
about one’s own future income, expenses, and health; and predictions about market
factors such as interest rates, investment fund performance, and inflation. The gulf
between the knowledge, comprehension, and skills of most American adults and those
needed in today’s market cannot be bridged by financial literacy education.
Efforts to teach consumers the meaning of “annual percentage rate” (“APR”), for
example, have failed spectacularly. For forty years, the law has required creditors to use
APR to disclose the cost of credit, so as to help consumers compare the cost of credit
products through a single metric that incorporates both fees and interest.73 But only 10
percent of surveyed consumers who had applied for or obtained home loans in the
previous five years understood the concept well enough to accurately answer whether the
APR is higher, lower, or the same as the note or loan contract interest rate—fewer than
would have guessed the correct answer by chance.74 Although people need not know
what APR means to learn a rule-of-thumb to shop for the lowest APR, if they do not
understand that it represents interest, points, and (most) fees over the term of the loan,
they cannot make welfare-enhancing tradeoffs among these. A “lowest APR” rule will
not help them choose between two loans with the same APR and term but different
67

James Kanter, Paulson Cautions Against Rush to Regulation in Credit Crisis, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007,
at C1.
68
Remarks by Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, on Current Housing and Mortgage Market
Developments, Georgetown University Law Center (Oct. 16, 2007).
69
Remarks by Henry M. Paulson, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury, on Recommendations from the President’s
Working Group on Financial Markets (Mar. 13, 2008) available at
http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp872.htm
70
DEANNE LOONIN ET AL., NEW BURDENS BUT FEW BENEFITS: AN EXAMINATION OF THE BANKRUPTCY
COUNSELING AND EDUCATION REQUIREMENT IN MASSACHUSETTS 37 (National Consumer Law Center, June
2007).
71
ROBERT LERMAN & ELIZABETH BELL, FINANCIAL LITERACY STRATEGIES: WHERE DO WE GO FROM HERE?:
OPPORTUNITY AND OWNERSHIP PROJECT REPORT NO. 1, 8 (Urban Institute, Aug. 2006).
72
Adult Financial Literacy Conference, FINANCIAL FOCUS 22 (Apr. 2006), available at
http://www.networksfinancialinstitute.org (quoting executive director of Networks Financial Institute).
Although industry-provided programs might be more up-to-date, these programs will inevitably have a bias
toward teaching lessons that will increase industry’s profits. See, e.g., [GET bias reports].
73
Truth in Lending Act, Regulation Z, 12 CFR 226.18(e).
74
Jinkook Lee & Jeanne M. Hogarth, The Price of Money: Consumers’ Understanding of APRs and Contract
Interest Rates, 18 J. PUB. POL’Y & MARKETING 66, 70 (1999).
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combinations of points, fees, and interest. Further, without sufficient understanding to
know when and why “lowest APR” is a good rule, they have little allegiance to it and can
be swayed by sales techniques that downplay APR.
The modern marketplace exacerbates consumer incomprehension because the jargon
and acronyms used, in addition to being specialized and unintuitive, usually are neither
standardized nor static. A readability assessment of credit card holder agreements found
that information regarding grace periods, balance computation methods, and payment
allocation methods was written at a fifteenth-grade or higher level. Almost half of U.S.
adults cannot read beyond the eighth-grade level.75
Personal finance decisions routinely require searching for information, much of
which must be extracted from text to be useable. Federal regulators, for example,
recently issued the following illustration of what sellers of interest-only or paymentoption ARMs should provide to “assist consumers in their product selection decisions”:76

But when faced with tables or graphs, people have difficulty understanding the
information, extracting figures, and performing implied arithmetic operations.77 Even
twenty-five years ago, when financial products were simpler, a review of life insurance
policies found their technical language and tabular format placed their readability
somewhere between The Wall Street Journal and Einstein's The Meaning of Relativity.78
Evaluating financial courses of action often requires multiplication, division, and
compounding and amortization calculations. Even with calculating aids, consumers need
sufficient understanding of the underlying concepts to know which calculations to make.
75

GAO supra note__, at 38.
Illustrations of Consumer Information for Nontraditional Mortgage Products, 72 Fed. Reg. 31825, 31826,
31830 (June 8, 2007).
77
Iddo Gal, Systemic Needs in Adult Numeracy Education, 12 ADULT BASIC EDUC. 20, 23 (2002).
78
Roger A. Formisano et al., Choice Strategy in a Difficult Task Environment, 8 J. CONSUMER RES. 474, 475
(1982).
76
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In a 2006 survey, however, over 80 percent of Baby Boomers approaching retirement
could not correctly answer the following question: “Let’s say you have 200 dollars in a
savings account. The account earns 10 percent interest per year. How much would you
have in the account at the end of two years?”79 Nearly half of the respondents did not
understand compounding and many others could not multiply and add well enough to
calculate 10 percent interest on $200 over two periods.
Facility with fractions and percentages is required for many personal finance
decisions, but people often treat all numerical values as whole positive integers.80 In an
experiment giving subjects investment returns information in percentage terms (shares
that had been $1 “experienced a 19 percent decrease”) or in dollar terms (shares
“decreased by $0.19”), subjects were more likely to take action (sell the stock) in
response to the percentage information than the dollar format, apparently responding to
the percentage term as if it were a whole integer.81 Sometimes people ignore fractional
amounts entirely,82 treating a 10 percent and a 10.8 percent interest rate as identical even
though a $240,000 30-year fixed rate mortgage at 10.8 percent will cost over $50,000
more than the same loan at 10 percent.83
Personal finance decisions often involve amounts of money greatly exceeding the
consumer’s daily experience. However, as numbers become larger, people have greater
difficulty distinguishing between them, even when the numbers remain equally far
apart.84 At the extreme, someone who could distinguish between paying $250 per month
and $300 per month for health insurance might fail to appreciate the difference between a
$252,000 and a $259,000 mortgage after a $7,000 broker fee is added. Large dollar
values can be too big to comprehend for those who rarely encounter them,85 yet many
major personal finance decisions must be made by evaluating large numbers. For
example, using 1998 figures, the difference between $504,700 versus $567,000 of
savings could determine whether a married couple could retire at age 65.86
Important financial decisions require reasonably accurate forecasts based on
probabilistic information.87 For example, forecasting future medical needs and the cost
of medical care is necessary to compare one insurance plan with a high deductible and
comprehensive catastrophic coverage to another with a low deductible and many
exclusions or coverage limits. Probabilities are another area, however, in which most
people have poor arithmetic intuitions. People tend to conceptualize probabilities as only
a few focal points such as very likely, somewhat likely, or very unlikely, rather than on a
continuous probability scale.88 This modal understanding of probabilities can lead to
poor decisions. For example, the probability of becoming sick with any particular major
illness may be small, but the collective probability of becoming sick with at least one

79
Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement Preparedness: Evidence and
Implications for Financial Education Programs, 42 BUS. ECON. 35, 39 (2007).
80
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tbl.1 & 23 (2005).
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such illness is much higher.89 If the consumer discounts small risks to zero then the
collective probability of needing medical care, which most consumers underestimate,90
could appear too small to warrant buying insurance.
In addition to arithmetic manipulation of data, determining the expected value of
many financial choices requires assessing information reliability and interpreting results.
The skills needed to take data about the past and information about the future and predict
the probabilities of future events and confidence intervals for those probabilities are
elusive for even sophisticated consumers. Becoming a Certified Financial Planner
therefore requires a program of study that includes financial planning, risk management
and insurance, estate planning, retirement planning, employee benefits, investments and
individual income tax, three years of relevant experience, a ten-hour exam that requires
an integrated application of skills and knowledge to particular client situations, and thirty
hours of continuing education every two years to maintain the credential.91
Consumers must acquire not only the particular knowledge and skills described
above, but also the ability to employ all of them at once. The U.S. Department of
Labor’s Taking the Mystery Out of Retirement Planning booklet guides individuals over
the course of 62 pages and through eight worksheets to determine how much they need to
save monthly to retire in ten years. To complete the worksheets, consumers must find
over 100 pieces of data from other sources, predict their monthly expenses in retirement,
predict rates of return so as to select growth and income conversion factors for each of
their assets, and repeatedly add, subtract, and multiply these figures.92 It is implausible
that financial literacy education could impart the knowledge, comprehension, and skills
consumers need to do what society currently demands.
C. Poor Conditions for Debiasing
Even if education could close the gulf between current consumer knowledge and skill
levels and those needed to make welfare-enhancing decisions in today’s credit, insurance,
and investment markets, this would not be enough. Psychologists and behavioral
economists have catalogued a host of influences apart from skill or information deficits
that can interfere with decisionmaking.
These influences include: biases that
systematically lead to over- or under-weighting various considerations when making a
decision;93 mental rules of thumb or “heuristics” by which complex decision tasks are
reduced “to simpler judgmental operations”;94 attraction to decisions that superficially
appear consistent;95 coping mechanisms that avoid or limit emotional discomfort during
decisionmaking;96 and visceral drives (hunger, pain, fear) that overwhelm reasoning.97
The following describes the ubiquity of these “biases” in personal finance
decisionmaking. There is no evidence that financial literacy education can change
89
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people’s biases, nor evidence of much effort by educators to do so. Yet even if financial
education programs tried to reduce or eliminate decisionmaking biases, the evidence on
debiasing presented below indicates that such an attempt would have little effect.
1. The Intangible Transaction Costs Schematic
Decisionmaking typically is conceived in terms of its outputs—the costs and benefits
of the selected alternative. More elaborate models consider tangible resources spent on
information search and processing.98 But “intangible transaction costs”99 are less
frequently accounted for even though they powerfully influence decisions. These
intangible costs include attention and effort spent on the process of decisionmaking,
negative or threatening feelings experienced during that process, cognitive dissonance,100
and energy required to inhibit visceral drives that might derail the process.
Cognitive and emotional resource outlays are usually invisible during
decisionmaking. People do not make conscious tradeoffs between intangible expenses
such as, for example, the emotional cost of considering one’s own mortality when
choosing whether and how much life insurance to buy, and tangible benefits such as
obtaining the best policy. Instead of weighing the cost of continuing discomfort against
the cost of making a decision without evaluating all alternatives, consumers tend
automatically and subconsciously to minimize use of intangible cognitive and emotional
resources.101 People minimize cognitive effort by relying on heuristics and allowing
biases to simplify decisionmaking, rather than engaging in deep cognitive processing.
They minimize the experience of negative emotions by avoiding or denying threats to
self-esteem and ego, and by escaping situations that cause unpleasant feelings such as
fear or embarrassment. They minimize cognitive dissonance by ignoring contradictory
information or misinterpreting that information as supportive of prior beliefs. They fail
to apply sufficient energy to inhibit visceral drives. Even when motivated to try to
engage in rational, effortful, careful decisionmaking, these attempts may be futile, and
can even deepen the effects of biases on the decision.
2. The Prevalence of Biases in Personal Finance Decisionmaking
Consumer financial decisions present a host of triggers for decisionmaking biases.
Commonly, these decisions concern emotionally-charged high stakes. The nonmonetary
considerations involve aspects of life most of us would rather not think about. When
making these decisions, households face a deluge of information and choices but also
substantial ambiguity and uncertainty. Financial choices are not merely about dollar
figures; they require tradeoffs between often incommensurable near and long term costs
and benefits. To avoid much of the time, effort, and unpleasantness of financial
decisionmaking, consumers often passively accept defaults or “free” (nonexpert) advice.
i. Overwhelming Information and Choices. Consumers today are drowning in
financial choices and detailed information about every one of them. Too many choices
98

See generally Herbert A. Simon, A Behavioral Model of Rational Choice, 69 Q.J. ECON. 99 (1955). Cf.
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101
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and too much information may be as harmful as too few and too little, however, for
reasons collectively called “information overload” and “choice overload.”102
In personal finance decisions, the quantity of information and number of products the
average consumer must search through is daunting. Because the costs of complete
information search and choice processing seem too high, the consumer may not even
attempt to use a rational decisionmaking strategy. For example, increasing the number of
retirement investment fund choices can overwhelm employees, pushing some to move
their allocations away from stock funds to low-risk low-return options, and paralyzing
others to the point that they are less likely to participate in their employer’s 401(k) plan at
all.103 When advertising from a small loan lender described a single loan choice rather
than a variety of loan sizes and term lengths, consumers were more likely to borrow; the
effect of simplifying by describing only a single alternative increased likelihood of
104
In
borrowing to the same degree as a 2.3 percentage drop in monthly interest rates.
buying life insurance, one study found that households had hundreds of companies to
choose from, each of which offered dozens of basic policies and riders. Faced with so
many choices, 75 percent of insureds reported considering only a single insurance
company and nearly as many allowed the salesperson to select their policy for them. As
the authors conclude, faced with choice overload, people “chose not to engage in
decision making.”105
Even when not deterred from decisionmaking, individuals may lack sufficient mental
resources to consider all alternatives and relevant information.106 People faced with more
than three alternatives typically use simplified decision strategies to quickly narrow their
choice set.107 One strategy is to focus on only the best-known alternatives; when new
employees were given a choice of 14 health plans, 83 percent signed up for one of the
two plans with the most well-known insurers.108 When selecting among the remaining
alternatives, people routinely consider fewer than five attributes of each alternative.109
Yet to make welfare-enhancing personal finance decisions, consumers must consider
102
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many attributes and a great deal of information. The Federal Reserve’s Handbook on
Adjustable Rate Mortgages instructs: “To compare two ARMs with each other or to
compare an ARM with a fixed-rate mortgage, you need to know about indexes, margins,
discounts, caps on rates and payments, negative amortization, payment options, and
recasting (recalculating) your loan.”110 Even if a consumer understood these attributes,
they are too numerous to make tradeoffs among them.
To the extent that financial education gives consumers even more information and
choices, it could increase overload, and thereby decrease decision quality.
ii. High Financial and Emotional Stakes. Financial choices pose the potential for
significant negative and significant positive material and emotional outcomes. Minimal
substantive regulation means that a wrong guess about future medical expenses, income,
life span, etc., could land the consumer in serious financial trouble, but also that
consumers can obtain credit and insurance relatively easily and even reap stock market
windfalls. Consumers often consider not only their own future welfare but also family or
household members for whose welfare they feel responsible or will be held accountable.
In addition, consumers may feel the weight of social judgment of their financial
behavior. American culture views financial decisions not merely as expressions of
preferences but as signifiers of character traits such as responsibility, trustworthiness,
self-control, industry, frugality, and wisdom.111 The possibility of failure to meet
financial expectations threatens a consumer’s ego, while purchasing a home, enjoying a
comfortable retirement, amassing wealth, and passing on that wealth to future generations
are all culturally esteemed. When financial success and failure are equated with
character, the former can lead to ego boosts and positive emotions, and the latter to ego
threats and negative emotions.112
High stakes, whether positive or negative, typically motivate people to expend more
effort in a conscious attempt to engage in systematic rational processing.113 Ironically,
however, high motivation and effort also frequently result in worse performance.114
When people anticipate receiving credit or blame for the outcome of a high stakes
decision, they find the decision more difficult and are more likely to engage in a losing
course of action.115 Why? Prior to the reasoning process, emotions or the “affect
heuristic” can exert great and often subconscious power over preferences, without any
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cognitive mediation.116 A consumer facing a high stakes personal finance decision is
likely to have an affective response, the positive or negative valence of which will
depend on whether the feelings aroused by potential costs or by potential benefits
dominate. Over the course of the decisionmaking process positive and negative affective
responses can see-saw. A former home loan officer explains “Be ready for an emotional
roller coaster. It really is true that your mortgage will probably be the most expensive
transaction of your lifetime, so don’t be surprised if it’s emotionally draining.”117
Fear of accountability for poor outcomes can be distressing, provoking anger,
embarrassment, or frustration. Unconscious processing of information can avoid these
negative feelings by biasing evaluations of alternatives in favor of the one that is chosen.
People with an initial inclination toward a particular choice, particularly when they feel
that potential negative consequences of a poor decision are high, will search for new data
and reinterpret existing data as favoring that choice and disfavoring alternatives.118
Another mechanism used to cope with these negative feelings is to truncate the decision
process, acting quickly rather than gathering all of the necessary information for making
the decision well.119 Marketers play to these emotional responses; personal finance
software programs advertise that they will help consumers make financial decisions
“quickly and easily,” and even, one software program developed by a psychologist
claims, “painlessly.”120
Indirectly, stress can occupy cognitive resources, reducing those available for
financial decisionmaking.121 With less capacity to handle the task at hand, the consumer
must take mental shortcuts, focusing on only a few salient, tangible, and immediate
dimensions of the decision.122 Although personal financial decisionmaking requires
assessing not only the costs and benefits but also the probabilities of decision outcomes,
stressful thoughts can lead people to ignore probabilities and consider only potential
costs, meaning that they will avoid a low probability high cost alternative even when the
expected value of other alternatives, once probabilities are taken into consideration,
would dictate a different result.123
On the other hand, focusing on potential positive outcomes of financial decisions can
lead to wishful thinking or irrational exuberance. People tend to confuse their emotional
response to the choice presented with a cognitive appraisal of underlying costs, benefits,
and risks. If they are focused on potential benefits, they will not merely weigh these
against expected costs but truly will perceive the costs and the probabilities of those costs
to be lower.124 For example, the positive vision of homeownership could lead households
116
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to home purchase and mortgage choices with expected costs that, neutrally appraised,
outweigh expected benefits.125 Likewise, a positive affective response to imagined
wealth could lead to mentally downplaying costs and risks and land the consumer in a
fraudulent financial scheme. As a Better Business Bureau officer explains: “Consumers
often know it’s a scam, but they want to believe so much that they participate knowing
they most likely will lose. They’re thinking so much about the prize, they don’t consider
that you shouldn’t have to pay [up front] to get it.”126
Ironically, the very stakes that motivate consumers to try to engage in good financial
decisionmaking can prevent them from reaching welfare-enhancing decisions. To the
extent that financial literacy education draws attention to the stakes involved, it
exacerbates this problem.127
iii. Discomforting Thoughts. Personal finance decisions require recognizing
susceptibility to misfortune, illness, aging, and even death, topics most people would
rather avoid. To come to rational decisions about how much debt to take on, what kind
of insurance to buy, and how much to save for retirement, consumers must assess the
probabilities, timing, and potential costs of these personal risks. These decisions demand
tradeoffs between money and life or health, protected values that people resist
commodifying.128 Contemplating these facts of life can bias decisionmaking, but so too
can the psychological mechanisms used to avoid contemplating these facts.
Thinking about unpleasant facts can bias decisionmaking by inducing fear or anxiety,
similar to the negative feelings that can be triggered by high stakes decisionmaking.
Because the negative feelings occupy attention, capacity for decisionmaking is reduced.
People at times escape the bad feelings by truncating the decision process to end it
quickly, at the expense of making a good decision. For example, avoiding thoughts about
death appears to contribute to inadequate purchase of life insurance. Nearly half of all
U.S. households have not purchased life insurance and think they should or have
purchased life insurance but think they should buy more.129 Households at risk for severe
declines in living standards upon the death of a wage-earner might find a lack of this
insurance particularly stressful. These families most need to have life insurance, yet are
the least likely to have it.
To avoid the fear and anxiety produced by contemplation of the unpleasant facts of
life, some consumers appear to engage in denial. For example, when asked in
anonymous surveys about their finances, consumers regularly engage in “debt denial,”
understating their credit card debts.130 Of particular relevance to financial decisions is
whether people are accurate in their expectations about their prospects of future
employment and income. In one longitudinal study, about one-third of workers who lost
their jobs had previously reported a zero expected probability of job loss. Even those
who reported a high expectation of job loss appeared to be in simultaneous denial of that
expectation—they did not reduce their household food consumption when they knew
125
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their job loss probability was high, but waited until they had lost their jobs to do so.131
This denial might help explain why borrowers agree to unaffordable loans, when a more
realistic assessment of income prospects would lead to less debt.
Alternatively, consumers can avoid fear and anxiety when contemplating objectively
unpleasant facts of life by perceiving personal risk overoptimistically, a pervasive bias.132
People maintain overoptimism about their own susceptibility to risks through
overconfidence or illusions as to the degree to which they can control whether these risks
befall them. Even when faced with a game of pure luck, people often perceive some
element of control, such as the way they throw the dice or the lottery card they choose.133
Although education might increase the accuracy of their knowledge about the actuarial
probabilities of negative life events, individuals frequently will continue to believe their
own odds are better so as to minimize thoughts of their personal vulnerability.134 Giving
consumers more information through financial education may only produce the “illusion
of knowledge.” When consumers are given more information about investments, for
example, they become overconfident in their ability to invest well, believing that the
information gives them more knowledge even when it does not.135
Overoptimism and overconfidence in personal finance decisionmaking is widespread.
Consumers fail to save enough for retirement in part because they are overoptimistic
about the future performance of their investments and because they have the illusion that
they can control their rate of return through savvy investment strategies.136 Although
many financial products in the U.S. come with disclosures about risks—e.g., “past
performance is no guarantee of future results,” “you could lose your home, and any
money you have put into it, if you do not meet your obligations under the loan”137—
consumers routinely ignore warnings that are not obviously tailored to their own
situation, assuming these warnings are for others.138 Insufficient retirement savings also
appears to be the product of overoptimism about health and ability to earn income during
retirement and denial about the probability of illness and of needing long-term care.139
Overconfidence probably plays a role in the persistence of high penalty credit card fees.
Competition does not drive fees down in part because “[m]ost people never anticipate
they will pay late, so they do not shop around for better late fees.”140
Effective financial literacy education must therefore reduce consumers’
overoptimism and their illusion of an unrealistic degree of control over their lives.
However, the use of this education as a policy tool is premised on the idea that consumers
131
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can, to a significant extent, control their financial situation. Financial literacy programs
are deemed a success when they strengthen participants’ “internal locus of control,” their
141
sense of self-efficacy in controlling their own financial condition.
Paradoxically,
financial literacy programs may increase overoptimism about financial risks in the course
of educating people about these risks.
iv. Uncertainty and the Future. Personal finance decisions must be made despite,
because of, and accounting for uncertainty—uncertainty about future medical expenses,
income, life span, disability, inflation, returns on investments, etc. Unfortunately,
decisions laced with future uncertainty are particularly likely to trigger biases.
People typically must mentally visualize and emotionally experience a future
contingency to give it weight in their decisions.142 Contingencies that are farther out in
the future, or more uncertain, can be less vividly brought to mind, and therefore influence
decisions less strongly than those that are immediate and certain.143 Time and uncertainty
can be conceptualized as decreasing the weight put on an outcome by making the current
imaginings of the outcome murkier, or immediacy and certainty can be seen as increasing
the weight put on an outcome by making the current imaginings more vivid. Time bias
correspondingly may reflect discounting or myopia, and certainty bias may reflect
ambiguity discounting or certainty preference.144
Not all future or uncertain consequences of decisions are equally affected by this
phenomenon; aspects construed at a high or abstract level are little affected, but lowerlevel concrete details are weighted more strongly when made more immediate and
certain.145 For example, regardless of time or uncertainty households are likely to place
the same value on homeownership, an abstract feature of a home loan, whereas they are
unlikely to attend as carefully to a change in the amount of a monthly loan payment if
that change is not happening anytime soon or the amount of the change is uncertain (an
ARM). As a consequence, decisions about near-term, certain events are judged by
tangible aspects such as feasibility, whereas events that are either long-term or uncertain
are judged by the desirability of the broad-brush outcome.
Consumer decisions about credit are easily influenced by time and certainty effects.
Anything bought on credit is an immediate benefit, and the costs of payment are always
in the future, making all uses of credit ripe for time bias.146 Consumers therefore will pay
higher prices and spend more overall using credit cards than when paying with cash.147
The pricing mechanisms used for credit products also capitalize on these biases. Teaser
rates on mortgage loans and credit cards are profitable for lenders in part because when
taking on the debt, borrowers often do not examine the feasibility of paying a higher
monthly amount when the teaser expires. Further, many think they will refinance or
switch cards as soon as the teaser ends because when they obtain the credit the logistical
costs of refinancing or switching in the future are discounted. When it comes time to
141
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refinance or switch, however, these costs loom large, leading to delay.148 When future
costs are uncertain, as with a teaser ARM tied to an index, the uncertainty bias might
heighten to this effect.149 Prepayment penalties, over-the-limit fees, late fees, and finance
charges, future expenses that are, from the consumer’s perspective, uncertain future costs
at the time of mortgage or credit card selection, probably do not register any weight on
decisionmaking about entering into loan contracts.150
Time and uncertainty biases partly account for failure to plan and save adequately for
retirement, even among consumers who know a fair amount about financial planning.151
Consumers are aware of the importance of retirement planning but “may procrastinate on
investing for retirement exactly because it is one of the most important life decisions.”152
Given its importance, consumers believe they should spend significant resources on
planning and saving for retirement, but bear the costs of these in the present while the
tangible benefits are in the future. To take advantage of compounding, people should
save for retirement early, when the benefits are farthest away and the most uncertain. To
plan, a consumer must forecast the future, including “lifetime earnings, asset returns, tax
rates, family and health status, and longevity.”153 Not only are these uncertain, but many
of them go to feasibility questions such as how much food, shelter, and health care will
cost per month after retirement. These uncertain future logistical matters are particularly
difficult to imagine and account for in the present.
Time and uncertainty biases undoubtedly contribute to inadequate insurance coverage
as well. Premium payments are certain and immediate, whereas the benefits of coverage
for insured events are uncertain and delayed. For example, consumers selecting health
insurance plans, unless they have existing health needs, tend to base their decisions on
premium prices and provider availability, near-term costs and benefits, rather than
uncertain future health needs.154
Educating consumers about these biases is unlikely to help. Consumers are aware of
their susceptibility these biases, and have developed numerous self-control mechanisms
to counteract them. They cut up their credit cards and use automatic withdrawals for
retirement plans. They support mandatory insurance coverage laws and accept mortgage
lender insurance conditions. They maintain mental accounts, setting (but not always
following) rules allowing themselves to spend only current income, not credit, for
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nondurables.155 Creating more and stronger precommitment devices could be helpful, but
is not financial literacy education.
v. Opaque Attributes and Incommensurate Tradeoffs. Financial products can be
difficult for consumers to evaluate. Even when they know which information they should
use and aim to make their decisions based on it, they frequently, albeit unconsciously,
focus instead on that which is the easiest to evaluate, including their own emotional
responses. The evaluability bias156 operates similarly to time and uncertainty biases, in
that aspects of a decision that are easier to evaluate, analytically or emotionally, weigh
more heavily in the decision than less evaluable—even if more important—aspects. For
example, the affect heuristic evoked by high stakes is an evaluability bias in that an
affective response creates an instantaneous evaluation, without decisionmaker effort. As
explained above, the heuristic can lead consumers to confuse outcomes with
probabilities, skewing expected value calculations necessary for good financial decisions.
Decision strategies that avoid tradeoffs among incommensurable features of financial
products reflect an evaluability bias.157 Where people have multiple options, some with
incommensurate features, a common response is to avoid trading off incommensurables
by ignoring alternatives or features that would require tradeoffs.158 For example, a
borrower might compare monthly payment amounts and APRs of mortgage options, but
if only one has a prepayment penalty, might ignore that feature rather than calculating its
worth in a common currency with monthly payment and APR. Another strategy to avoid
difficult comparisons is to select the alternative that appears average, relative to the
alternatives presented, along every dimension about which the consumer lacks
preexisting preferences.159 In one experiment, subjects choosing among three retirement
investments with given associated risk levels tended to select the middle-ranked option,
regardless of absolute risk level or which investments were presented.160 Decisions using
this strategy depend on where each alternative falls within the consumer’s choice set.
Similarly, consumers frequently rely on the information handed to them in forming
their assessment of a product, and if key information is missing, will neglect that fact.161
Although insureds report that quality of healthcare is paramount in selecting a health
plan, few look beyond the promotional materials they receive to consult quality ratings
from a neutral source.162 This “omission neglect” bias is less likely when the consumer
knows the product type well and the decision context provides reference points that
highlight the missing information.163 But consumers are rarely knowledgeable about
financial products, and sellers hide cues that would call attention to omitted information.
About a third of all home loan borrowers in a national survey said their lender presented
them with only a single loan option.164
155
Richard H. Thaler, Mental Accounting Matters, 12 J. BEHAV. DEC. MAKING 183, 184 (1999); Amar
Cheema & Dilip Soman, Malleable Mental Accounting: The Effect of Flexibility on the Justification of
Attractive Spending and Consumption Decisions, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 33, 42 (2006).
156
Christopher K. Hsee, The Evaluability Hypothesis: An Explanation for Preference Reversals Between
Joint and Separate Evaluations of Alternatives, 67 ORG. BEHAV. & HUMAN DEC. PROCESSES 247, 255-56
(1996).
157
Id; Dedre Gentner & Arthur B. Markman, Structural Alignment in Comparison: No Difference Without
Similarity, 5 PSYCHOL. SCI. 152 (1994).
158
See Brownstein, supra note__, at 555 (citing sources).
159
Ravi Dhar et al., Trying Hard or Hardly Trying: An Analysis of Context Effects on Choice, 9 J. CONSUMER
PSYCHOL. 189, 197-98 (2000); Itmar Simonson & Amos Tversky, Choice in Context: Tradeoff Contrast and
Extremeness Aversion, 29 J. MKTG RES. 281, 282 (1992).
160
Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, How Much Is Investor Autonomy Worth?, 57 J. FINANCE 1593,
1594-95 (2002).
161
Frank R. Kardes et al., Debiasing Omission Neglect, 59 J. BUS. RES. 786, 786 (2006).
162
McLaughlin, supra note__, at 46.
163
Kardes, supra note__, at 786.
164
FANNIE MAE, NATIONAL HOUSING SURVEY 2001, at 6 (2002).

WILLIS

AGAINST FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION – 3/20/08 DRAFT

25

A related decisionmaking shortcut is the “availability heuristic.”165 When events,
costs, benefits, and information are experienced, observed, or received frequently,
recently, or with vividness or strong emotion, they are more easily brought to mind.
Even when consumers have the numerical knowledge and skills to use statistical data—
which seems dry, abstract, and remote—they often ignore that data in favor of making
judgments based on the mental “availability” of an event. The more mentally available
an event is, the more probable it seems. The more mentally available a cost or benefit is,
the larger it seems. The more mentally available a piece of information is, the greater
weight put on it in decisionmaking.
The classic demonstration of the availability heuristic is in the personal finance
realm. When consumers living in floodplains decide whether to purchase flood
insurance, they are more strongly influenced by personal experience than by objective
information about the probability and costs of a future flood.166 This bias likely also
contributes to consumer failure to appreciate financial product risks that are not mentally
available. Although news stories report on high mortgage default rates, the paperwork of
the foreclosure process does not lend itself to dramatic photographs or video footage. A
sheriff placing the former homeowner’s belongings on the street would catch attention,
but virtually no consumers stay in the home long enough for this to happen.167 Because
poor credit outcomes are viewed as the product of bad character, consumers who have
lost their homes to foreclosure generally avoid advertising that fact. With the low
availability of images of foreclosure within the minds of most consumers, they are likely
to underestimate the risk and costs of foreclosure at the time they take the loan.
The availability heuristic is routinely exploited by sellers of financial products.
Historical returns data are prominent in investment fund prospectuses. Although the fees
associated with investments should be weighted as heavily, if not more, than past returns,
fees are buried in the fine print. The unsurprising result is that active consumer investors
chase returns.168 In an experiment in which MBA students chose among several index
funds, they consistently ranked fees as the most important factor in their decision.169 Yet
giving the students irrelevant information (each fund’s returns since inception, which
varied based only on the lifespan of the fund) in a salient manner (on a single, separate
piece of paper) increased the average weight returns data had on their decisions. They
were unable to ignore visually prominent information they knew was irrelevant.
Another evaluation shortcut is the representativeness heuristic. Consumers tend to
judge unfamiliar products based on their similarity to familiar products, even when
important features differ.170 That is, one product is taken to be representative of another
along more than the dimensions they share. Consumers chase investment returns in part
because they believe past performance is representative of future performance, regardless
of how many times they are told otherwise.171 The representativeness heuristic can make
experience a poor teacher, particularly in a quickly-changing market. Experience can lull
consumers into a false sense of security when they assume their knowledge of an earlier
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product applies to a new product of the same type.172 For example, many believe “that a
lender would not provide credit to a consumer who did not have the capacity to repay.”173
When lenders engaged in credit rationing this assumption was reasonable because
creditors made loans based on projections that borrowers could afford payments. As
consumers are slowly discovering, that is no longer true now that today’s lending models,
with varying degrees of success, can price default risk.174
Use of the availability and representativeness heuristics can result in estimating the
frequency of an event to be lower than the sum of the frequencies of components, called
the “subadditivity effect.”175 For example, “losing one’s job” could be too vague to bring
an available image to mind, and therefore a consumer might underestimate its probability.
The detail in the mental picture of component events that could cause job loss—losing
one’s job because of becoming disabled, because of factory closure, etc.—can increase
probability assessments of each, so that their assessed probabilities sum to a more
accurate, larger figure.176 The representativeness heuristic could also cause subadditivity.
Consumers might estimate the probability of not job loss, but rather the most likely cause
of job loss, and then extrapolate this as representative of the broader category of job loss.
Consumers might try to account for other causes of job loss by increasing their
probability estimate somewhat, but due to anchoring effects, discussed below, will be
unlikely to adjust their estimates enough to account for all causes.177 This subadditivity
effect can derail good personal finance decisions because many—how much debt to
incur, how much to save for retirement this month, how much to save for a rainy day,
etc.—are based in large part on forecasts about income and employment.
Consumers do not want to evaluate choices based on inaccurate predictions. They
want to make tradeoffs among incommensurate traits and to pay adequate consideration
to traits that are difficult to evaluate.178 Educating consumers that they should use
healthcare quality ratings or a cost/benefit strategy would not debias them. They already
know that making these tradeoffs is preferable—in one survey, 61 percent of Americans
said that it is important to comparison shop for insurance—but find themselves unable to
do so in practice—only 39 percent of respondents said they did so.179
vi. The Passivity Alternative: Defaults and “Experts.” Consumers are not forced to
make many of their own financial decisions, and so must first overcome inertia and
passivity to even begin to engage in financial planning. A number of biases are at work
here: status quo and anchoring biases, omission or inertia bias, and biases in advisor
selection and advice acceptance.
The status quo and anchoring biases are tendencies to stay with whatever the status
quo or initial “anchor” position is, even when conditions have changed or the
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decisionmaker’s own needs would dictate a position far from the anchor.180 Consumer
“decisions” about health care plans, for example, appear to be strongly affected by these
biases. Once consumers initially choose a plan, they are very unlikely to change,
regardless of changes in their health care needs that would make switching to another
plan beneficial.181 Over a ten-year period, only 15 percent of federal government
employees, who have a large number of health plans to choose from, report even
considering changing plans.182 The same is true for investment allocations in retirement
plans. Once employees make an initial allocation between stock funds and bond or
money market funds, they are unlikely to change that allocation, despite widespread
advice to shift from higher to lower risk investments as retirement draws near.183
Even when making an initial “decision,” people frequently accept options chosen by
others. The classic study here is of auto insurance: New Jersey and Pennsylvania both
gave their residents a choice between the type of auto insurance plan already on the
market and a new type that had lower rates and limited the insured’s right to sue. In New
Jersey the default was the new plan, and in Pennsylvania it was the old plan. Over 80
percent of New Jersey residents “selected” the new plan, but 75 percent of
Pennsylvanians “selected” the old plan, evidence that many people did not select their
plan at all, but simply accepted the default.184 Retirement fund decisions follow a similar
pattern, in that many employees keep whatever contribution level and allocation the plan
sponsor set as a default. Regardless of whether the employer’s default contribution rate
is 2 percent or 6 percent, a majority of employee contributions appear to mirror the
default rate. This does not reflect differences in retirement needs; when companies
change their defaults for new employees, the old employees often stay at the old default
and the new employees accept the new default.185
Why do consumers stay with a status quo that is no longer—or never was—the best
option for them? Beyond choice overload and procrastination resulting from time biases
described above, consumers who are uncertain whether changes would improve their
finances may stick with the status quo to avoid blame for any poor outcomes. The
omission or inertia bias, a tendency to judge the quality and morality of actions but not to
pass judgment on failures to act, will exonerate them from staying with the default.186
Actions are salient, available in thought, and therefore likely to be judged, whereas
omissions are not salient and are ignored.
Consumer passivity is abetted by the market participants who have an interest in
deciding how consumers should arrange their financial affairs. Of course, when faced
with a difficult decision involving specialized knowledge, a normally quite appropriate
response is to seek advice from an expert. When the advisor employs the necessary
expertise and acts in the consumer’s best interests, relying on the advisor to make the
decision can reduce the effects of the consumer’s biases on the decision.187
Unfortunately, consumers have difficulty selecting advisors possessing sufficient
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expertise and incentives to act in the consumers’ best interests. Once a consumer selects
an advisor, reliance on the advisor can become another form of passivity in that the
consumer may not sufficiently monitor the advisor’s performance.188
Selection of inexpert advisors is particularly likely for important financial decisions
because as decision stakes and difficulty increase, people rely less on rational criteria in
favor of emotional criteria. When stakes are low, they favor the advice of a qualified
expert, but when stakes are high, they rely on advice from friends, family, or others
perceived to be benevolent. When subjects were asked whose advice they would rely on
when choosing whether to keep money in a risky investment fund, the “Chief Advisor for
mutual funds at an internationally successful investment firm” or an “especially caring
and honest” accountant with limited experience, they chose the former for a less
important decision and the latter for the more important decision. Although this might
appear to be a conscious and rational tradeoff between benevolence and accuracy,
consumers avoid the tradeoff. Instead, as decisions become more emotionally fraught,
consumers perceive benevolent advisors to dispense more accurate advice than experts.189
Consumers fail to employ expert financial advisors for more tangible reasons as well.
Even if consumers knew how to select a qualified expert, not everyone has the resources
to hire or enough money at stake to warrant hiring a financial advisor.190 This is an
informational problem too; before implementing an expert’s advice, a consumer has little
means to determine whether its benefits will outweigh its costs. Without independent
advice, consumers tend to rely on the advice dispensed by the “expert” closest at hand,
the seller. Even with substantial literacy gleaned from financial education, the consumer
rarely will be as familiar as a salesperson with the latest financial products.191 This “free”
advice may have a price. Among other things, yield spread premiums for selling
consumers higher cost mortgages than that for which they qualify192 and soft-dollar
payments to investment brokers for favoring particular funds193 can place the financial
interests of mortgage and investment brokers at odds with their clients.
Financial product salespeople can take advantage of the “reciprocity effect” invoked
by “befriending” the consumer, who then reciprocates the seller’s “kindness” with trust
and business.194 Social mores inhibit customers from challenging the credibility of this
new “friend.” Linguistic conventions contribute to role confusion: the broker, officer, or
agent is “my broker,” “my loan officer,” or “my agent” even without any fiduciary duty
to the consumer; the agent or broker “gets” or “finds” a policy or mortgage and the
insurer or lender “gives” the coverage or credit, rather than “selling” the financial
product. Once trusted, sellers have broad opportunities to influence consumer financial
decisions. As a former loan officer explains: “You don’t lie to your client, but you make
them feel like you’re their best friend and can be trusted.”195
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Examples abound. If a homeowner is stressed by the mortgage buying process, a
lender might invoke the representativeness heuristic to calm her. One lender training
manual directed its loan officers, when they placed a stack of paperwork in front of
refinance mortgage borrowers to sign, to announce: “Okay, folks, we have about fifteen
papers to okay. Now, most of these papers are the same ones you signed when you took
out your last mortgage.”196 If selling investments or insurance that will have costs now
and uncertain benefits later, the broker might emphasize higher-level abstract benefits,
which are less affected by time and uncertainty biases.197 Focusing on the low price of
these products, for example, is unlikely to be persuasive, but as insurance and investment
advertising indicates, a better strategy is to remind consumers that buying these products
demonstrates their love for, and will be reciprocated by love from, their blissful families.
Similarly, a former mortgage broker explains that rather than focusing on feasibility
dimensions such as monthly payment, he would ask the borrower in great detail about her
plans for the loan proceeds. If her plan was to build a bedroom for her daughter painted
purple, then throughout the mortgage purchase process he would invoke the vivid image
of the purple room with her daughter enjoying it.198
Certainly not all attempts to maneuver consumer biases are effective; significant
variability in susceptibility to any particular bias exists not only among people, but within
a single individual at different times, in different moods, etc. The potential for biased
decisionmaking, however, has not gone unnoticed by the financial services industry. The
insurance industry adage has spread to the rest of the industry—that their wares, whether
insurance, credit, or investment products, are “sold not bought.”199
3. The Difficulty of Debiasing200 Personal Finance Decisionmaking
Biases are resistant to change, particularly under the conditions presented by most
personal finance decisions. Telling consumers they must think more carefully before
making a financial decision will have no effect on unconscious biases. Consumers might
increase their conscious attention and effort, but they will do so in the same biased
way.201 People are often unable to recognize their biases and prevent the effects of these
biases on their decisions, even when taught about them.202 However, particular
196
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conditions can reduce the prevalence and influence of biases. Unfortunately, these
conditions rarely exist in the context of personal finance decisions, and education
probably cannot create these conditions, at least not without exacerbating other biases.
i. Repeat Play With Immediate Unambiguous Feedback. The most widely cited
debiasing method is to give the decisionmaker immediate, unambiguous, and accurate
feedback over a series of repeated decisions presented in the same form. In lab
experiments, this method has sometimes reduced overconfidence,203 but not other
biases.204 Consumers do not receive immediate and unambiguous feedback about their
financial decisions based on experience alone because most outcomes are delayed and
causation is ambiguous.205 However, an education program might attempt to employ the
strategy by requiring feedback before a financial decision is final or after a consumer has
experienced a bad financial outcome. Simulated financial decisionmaking in the
classroom could be followed by immediate and unambiguous feedback. All of these have
been tried, but with little success.
Credit counseling is now a precondition for filing for bankruptcy206 and, in some
states, for obtaining certain high-priced mortgages.207 Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
require homeownership education, with a financial focus, for some of their affordable
mortgage programs. In theory, debiasing feedback could be effective at this juncture.
However, many consumers already will have shifted from a decisionmaking to an
implementation frame of mind. Providers of popular homeownership education
programs conducted by phone report that over 80 percent of their participants already
have signed a contract to buy a home when they seek the education.208 Once a consumer
has committed to a course of action she will be resistant to learning that the decision she
just made was poor, particularly because her sunk costs—the efforts she has just put into
hiring an attorney and preparing their documents for bankruptcy or into the home
purchase or loan application process—will then be for naught.209 Additionally, the
consumer usually faces time pressure to close on the home purchase or loan or to file for
bankruptcy to stop a foreclosure.210 Time and attention needed to learn new financial
decisionmaking processes are scarce.
203
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At this juncture, consumers might misinterpret the feedback in a process called
motivated reasoning.211 Once people have developed a judgment, contradictory evidence
can create an uncomfortable feeling of cognitive dissonance. Consumers sometimes
expend the effort to revise their prior judgments, but frequently misinterpret ambiguous
evidence as providing further support for their prior decisions and reject plainly
unsupportive evidence.212 Although motivated reasoning cannot change the terms of a
consumer credit product, for example, the future is uncertain enough to allow consumers
to reason that they do not need to worry about future interest rate increases because they
will refinance before then.213
Consumers may be more amenable to receiving financial education once a bad
financial outcome occurs. A financial education course is required for discharge in
bankruptcy, in addition to the required pre-filing credit counseling.214 Consumers
consistently report that they believe the single most important source of learning about
personal finance is a difficult experience.215 Like homeowners after a flood, consumers
who have experienced a bad financial outcome will judge the probability or the costliness
(or both) of that outcome to be higher than if they had visualized the outcome vaguely, as
a future uncertain event. But—assuming a better decision could have forestalled the
problem—consumers must learn more than that the probability of a costly outcome was
high; they must understand specifically what went wrong in the prior decision and how
that information applies to future decisions.
In practice, by the time consumers have recovered enough from their bad financial
experiences to seek financial education, they are unlikely to recall their prior decision
processes accurately, and what they do recall will be shaped by ensuing events.216 The
process of mentally reconstructing past decisionmaking can increase any bias that
affected the decision, because consumers are motivated to justify their past reasoning.217
Even with perfect recall, causation will be ambiguous, given that financial troubles are
usually attributable to multiple sources. With ambiguous feedback, the overconfidence
bias is unlikely to be reduced, because consumers tend to attribute successes to their own
abilities and to blame failures on uncontrollable circumstances.218 Finally, lessons
learned from prior decisions may no longer apply in light of changes in the marketplace.
Educational financial games such as the Money Game, created for the purpose of
financial education, also employ immediate, unequivocal, accurate feedback. Assuming
the more financially knowledgeable students do not self-select into playing, education
through the game appears to lead to a slight increase in knowledge.219 Nonetheless, this
knowledge does not appear to improve financial behavior; students who play the Money

211

Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Reasoning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
Lee Ross & Craig A. Anderson, Shortcomings in the Attribution Process: On the Origins and
Maintenance of Erroneous Social Assessments, in JUU, supra note__, at 129, 144-52.
213
Christopher K. Hsee, Elastic Justification, 62 ORG. BEHAV. & HUM. DECISION PROCESSES 330 (1995).
Some consumers will change their decisions as a result of counseling, but learning is not necessarily at work
here; a consumer might be following the counselor’s instruction without understanding its basis.
214
Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act, 109 P.L. 8, § 105 (2005).
215
Marianne A. Hilgert et al., Household Financial Management: The Connection Between Knowledge and
Behavior, Jul. 2003 FED. RES. BULL. 309.
216
See Prabhu & Tellis, supra note__, at 21.
217
Gavan J. Fitzsimons & Baba Shiv, Nonconscious and Contaminative Effects of Hypothetical Questions on
Subsequent Decision Making, 28 J. CONSUMER RES. 224, 237 (2001).
218
This has been called the self-serving or attribution bias. E.g., Bhandari & Deaves, supra note__.
219
The average score nationwide on the Jump$tart 2002 financial literacy test was 50.2% correct, whereas the
average for students who had played the Money Game was 52.4% correct. Jump$tart Coalition, From Bad to
Worse: Financial Literacy Drops Further Among 12th Graders (Apr. 23, 2002). Because the test consists of
30 multiple choice questions, this difference is less than a single correct answer.
212

WILLIS

AGAINST FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION – 3/20/08 DRAFT

32

Game report poorer financial habits than students who do not.220 These results are
consistent with the findings of studies that advocate feedback as a debiasing tool. In
these experiments, debiasing did not transfer to tasks presented in new formats.221
Further, the experiments did not test how long the debiasing effect lasted. Students
playing the Money Game probably get better at playing the game, but the most realistic
game cannot mirror real-life environments given the possible combinations of conditions
in which personal finance decisions are made, the relationships among financial and
nonfinancial decisions, and the ever-changing nature of the marketplace.
ii. Consider-the-Opposite. Another debiasing method is to “consider the opposite,”
meaning reasons the decision or the assumptions on which it depends might be incorrect,
before finalizing a decision.222 By calling them to mind, alternative assessments become
more mentally available, in theory increasing the weight consumers place upon them.
Overconfidence and underconfidence have been moderated somewhat in lab experiments
using this technique.
Consumer education might teach consumers that they should consider the opposite,
yet whether they would or even could follow this instruction is questionable. Subjects in
experimental conditions told to write down reasons against their decisions had difficulty
doing so, and some even listed no reason at all or wrote down supporting rather than
contradicting reasons.223 These subjects incurred no opportunity costs in finding an
opposite reason; unlike consumers making financial decisions, subjects trapped in a lab
could not choose to spend their time doing something more demonstrably useful than
considering the opposite.224
In the real world, no one tells the consumer when and how she should employ the
consider-the-opposite strategy. Should she consider the opposite of her plan to keep one
credit card account, or of her plan to close her other accounts? Is the opposite of her
prediction that stocks will go up five percent each year on average the possibility that
stocks might perform worse, or might perform better? Is her acceptance of the defaults
her employer has set for life and disability insurance a decision? Although a financial
education class could provide examples of points at which to employ the consider-theopposite strategy, the world is too unpredictable, varied, and dynamic to teach consumers
how to apply the strategy in their lives.
Even if a consumer could correctly identify when and how to use the strategy,
consider-the-opposite does not tell the consumer how to decide between a planned
decision and the opposite. Considering the opposite might lead to paralysis if she can not
determine the expected value of the opposite as compared to her prior choice.
Tests of the consider-the-opposite strategy in experiments resembling consumer
decisions have repeatedly failed to debias subjects. Asking subjects to generate a list of
reasons why a bad outcome might occur had no effect on overoptimism about their own
220
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likelihood of developing a health problem. Even when experimenters provided subjects
with data about the prevalence of these risk factors, many subjects interpreted the
information as depicting worst case scenarios not applicable to themselves. Only giving
subjects information about their personal standing on relevant risk factors as compared to
the general population appears to be a promising route for debiasing overoptimism.225
The rough equivalent in the personal finance context would be individualized financial
advice. This is not education.
iii. Consider the Pros and Cons. Listing the arguments for and against a financial
decision or a prediction on which a decision is based would seem to be the next debiasing
strategy to try, as it would avoid the potential misapplication of the consider-the-opposite
strategy. For biased consumers, listing pros and cons could trigger her thinking to negate
the availability heuristic’s influence on her decision, regardless of whether she is underor overconfident to begin with. This method has debiased subjects who, in response to
negative emotions and stress, selected investments based on payoffs rather than taking
probability information into account. When instructed to list the pros and cons of each
investment, these subjects chose the investments with the higher expected value
regardless of payoff amount.226
But the process of listing pros and cons focuses attention on factors that the consumer
articulates, at the expense of less accessible relevant factors. That is, when the decision is
not about a controlled game with few features, but about personal finances, the list of
pros and cons is likely to be incomplete, leading to omission neglect, discussed above. If
the less articulable attributes are important, listing reasons for a decision can decrease
decision quality.227 For example, subject predictions of their own behavior were less
accurate when they listed the reasons why they might or might not engage in the
behavior.228 The accuracy of consumer predictions about their own future behavior is
critical in personal financial decisionmaking, given that they steadfastly refuse to use
statistical data rather than personally-generated beliefs. If introspection about reasons for
future actions leads to less accurate predictions, teaching consumers to carefully consider
the reasons their predictions might not come true could lead them to worse decisions.
Further, this debiasing technique is successful only when pros and cons are listed
prior to the decision. Having subjects make a choice and then list supporting and
contradicting reasons did not reduce overconfidence.229 Once they had made a decision,
the overconfident subjects discounted even self-generated contradicting reasons. To use
this debiasing technique, consumers would need to know when they were about to make,
but had not yet made, a financial decision. However, decisionmaking involving tradeoffs
among costs and benefits does not proceed linearly from perception to a hunt for
alternatives to research about each alternative to evaluation to decision. Unless
performed using quick heuristic strategy (such as when trying to avoid stress or when in a
negative mood, described above), the process is recursive.230 The fruits of any search are
likely to depend on which options are salient in the marketplace or suggested by friends
or happenstance. Assessment of alternatives begins during the process of finding them.
Consumers’ encoding of information about alternatives will depend on their moods and
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affective responses to their prior information.231 Once the search stops, they are likely to
be inclined toward one option; consumers often “satisfice”—they decide when to stop
232
searching based on their belief that they have found a satisfactory alternative.
If a consumer were to list pros and cons, this might appear to be the point to do so.
By now, though, the consumer’s collected choice set of alternatives and information
about them is biased. Further, she probably has made an unconscious decision and will
resist changing it, even in the face of contrary evidence. Even without new information,
the consumer might reinterpret the information she already has in light of her
commitment; subjects’ probability of success estimates for an investment are higher after
they have chosen one than before, even though the only new information they possess is
their own decision.233 Before ascertaining all options, a consumer cannot assess the pros
and cons of each, yet afterwards, it is too late to use this debiasing strategy.
iv. Construct Preferences Before Shopping. When shopping for some types of
products, the evaluability biases, myopic time bias, and manipulation by salespersons or
point-of-sale advertising might conceivably be moderated by constructing preferences
before entering the marketplace. Because a lack of well-defined preferences increases
susceptibility to bias, constructing preferences first, in effect creating a shopping list,
might reduce the opportunity for biases to operate. Although this could easily lead to a
satisficing strategy, such a result might be better than accepting whatever product the
salesperson suggests. This might mitigate the avoidance strategy induced by stress, high
stakes, and the unpleasantness of considering the negative aspects of life, in that the
consumer could not end her shopping process without obtaining an acceptable product.
One study employed this method to reduce the omission neglect bias discussed
above. When subjects rated the importance of a list of product attributes before they
started examining the products in the market, they were less likely to neglect any lack of
information on a factor they had previously determined to be important.234 But in
personal finance matters, consumers need to know what the market offers to determine
what product attributes are possible and at what cost. A consumer knows the grocery
store will have apples and chocolate bars, can make a decision between them prior to
shopping, and, with sufficient willpower, can implement that decision at the store. Given
the velocity of change in the insurance, investment, and mortgage markets, a consumer
who lists requirements based on past experience is likely to have difficulty even
identifying which products possess those attributes.
In theory, financial literacy education could help consumers construct preferences
before shopping by teaching them a checklist of important product features. Many
personal finance decision aids do just that, but changes in financial products on the
market mean that any list will be quickly out-of-date. Educators might try to keep
consumers current through public service announcements about frequently-ignored
aspects of financial decisions. However, the number of attributes that consumers need to
consider in today’s complex transactions would limit the extent to which education about
one or two aspects could improve consumer decisionmaking.235 Further, education
programs may teach “the list” of attributes to look for, but are unlikely to give consumers
231
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a sufficiently deep understanding of the list to feel committed to it. Without commitment
to underlying decision rules, lists are easily brushed aside.236
Additionally, unless a single alternative dominates on all attributes, a list of attributes
is insufficient to select a financial product without a way to make tradeoffs among
attributes. The thousands of worksheets in financial education materials do not explain
how to choose among alternatives once the information is compiled. A short example:237
Long-Term Care Insurance Policy Comparison Worksheet
Use the worksheet below to list the cost and features of three different long-term care (LTC)
insurance policies. Then compare the three providers to determine the best policy for you.
LTC Policy Feature
LTC Policy
LTC Policy
LTC Policy
Provider #1
Provider #2
Provider #3
Services covered (e.g., home care,
adult day care, custodial care, etc.)
Amount of daily benefit
Length of coverage
Elimination period
Inflation adjustment
Requirement for coverage...
Additional features (e.g., premium
waiver after 90 days of coverage)
Annual/monthly cost

Without a way to make tradeoffs among policy features, collecting this information is
likely to be more frustrating than helpful.
Finally, the list of attributes the consumer must consider can itself cause problems. If
asked to compare alternatives along a list of attributes, consumers find it more difficult to
make decisions because all options have some pros and cons. Because a list can induce
consumers to weigh each attribute evenly even when one or two attributes are more
important, all options can appear to be of similar value.238 Asking consumers to consider
every relevant piece of information is also likely to lead to information overload.
v. Time and Space for Deliberation. Some sources of biases in financial
decisionmaking can subside over time and psychological distance from the salesperson.
For example, stress or negative emotions occupy mental resources and reduce
decisionmaking quality, but emotions come and go. Time to deliberate could help a
consumer sift through information and choices to reduce overload effects. Trust in a
salesperson might decrease when the consumer is no longer in the presence of this
newfound “friend.” An obvious method of debiasing would be to teach consumers to
take time and space for deliberation: a “chilling out” or “warming up” period.239
The theoretical literature supports the use of cooling off periods for important,
irrevocable decisions,240 but the usefulness of deliberation time depends on what
consumers do with this time. They could gather more evidence or reevaluate existing

236

Amer Cheema & Dilip Soman, Malleable Mental Accounting: The Effect of Flexibility on the Justification
of Attractive Spending and Consumption Decisions, 16 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 33, 42-43 (2006).
237
The Financial Aspects of Health and Long-Term Care Insurance in Later Life, Rutgers New Jersey
Agricultural Experiment Station, available at http://njaes.rutgers.edu/healthfinance/insurance-ltc.asp.
238
Wilson & Schooler, supra note__, at 182.
239
Willis, supra note__, at 214-15. This is a variant on “cooling off” periods permitting consumers to
rescind after making the decision. E.g., FTC Door to Door Sales Cooling Off Rule, 16 CFR § 429. Because
consumers become psychologically committed to the choices they make, a deliberation period prior to the
transaction is preferable.
240
George Loewenstein et al., Projection Bias in Predicting Future Utility, 118 Q. REV. ECON 1209, 1239
(2003).

WILLIS

AGAINST FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION – 3/20/08 DRAFT

36

evidence to enhance support for their decisions.241 They could consider the opposite or
list the pros and cons. Time for deliberation could easily become another excuse for
inertia. Time and space from a salesperson could create an opportunity to consult with
friends or experts, but giving consumers access to good advice is a policy proscription
beyond education.
Although time for deliberation decreases some biases, others appear to increase or
remain unchanged. If the initial information received about alternatives was encoded in a
biased manner, deliberating about the encoded information will replicate the bias.
“Framing” effects of context can increase when the decisionmaker is given more time to
perceive and incorporate more information, even when the information should be
This is particularly true for difficult decisions, whether due to
irrelevant.242
accountability for the decision, ambiguity or uncertainty imbedded within the decision, or
incommensurability of attributes among alternatives. For example, with enough time,
people faced with incommensurable tradeoffs are more likely to gather and use
contextual information such as the nature of the alternatives in the choice set. A common
heuristic strategy then employed is to avoid extremes and choose an average
alternative.243 This strategy works well only when the less extreme, average alternative
in the choice set is better. Thus, the effectiveness of taking more time to make financial
decisions can depend on the consumer’s choice set. But controlling each consumer’s
choice set would require regulation, not financial education.
“Teaching” consumers to take time and distance to deliberate may not add anything
to what consumers already know. Consumers know they should not make important
financial decisions impulsively and that they should not fall prey to sales techniques. The
problem is that in the heat of the moment, the consumer’s emotional response
overwhelms that knowledge. Financial literacy education has little hope of changing that.
vi. Individual Differences. One could devise other debiasing strategies to try, but
every strategy has the potential to backfire because past experiences, socialization,
decision context, personality, cognitive abilities, values, and more will differ for every
consumer, and can radically affect the outcomes of debiasing techniques.
The operation of the availability heuristic, for example, will depend on what the
consumer finds salient based on personal experience, memory, and immediate
environment. The representativeness heuristic operates on the consumer’s personal past
experience with products or situations which, to this consumer, seem similar to the one at
hand. Information overload causes all consumers to reduce most decisions to a small
number of salient characteristics, but within this bound, consumers consider different
attributes and use different choice strategies.244 The operation of time and uncertainty
will differ both across consumers and across situations, depending on the vividness and
detail with which each consumer internally visualizes the future uncertain event, such
that no one discount rate or myopic preference rate can be applied.245
The variation in overconfidence/overoptimism versus underconfidence/pessimism
within the consumer population246 poses a significant hurdle for debiasing. As noted
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above, the consider-the-opposite strategy decreases overconfidence in some but increases
underconfidence in others. A debiasing strategy of listing the pros and cons can lead
some people to reduce their prior assessments of the probability of negative
consequences247—introducing the possibility that this intervention could lead to
overoptimism in some consumers.
Financial literacy education programs today attempt to tailor their content for
different audiences based on the financial situation and needs of the audience. Perhaps
they could hit upon a strategy that would debias some consumers, some of the time.
Unfortunately, consumers are not easily sorted by bias-susceptibility type into different
248
personal finance classes.
Although public education campaigns might be designed to
respond to a variety of biases, they risk sending the wrong message to some consumers.
D. Reaching Consumers at Teachable and Vulnerable Moments
Educators resoundingly agree that personal finance should not be taught in the
abstract, but instead at a “teachable moment”—“a point when the information seems
immediately relevant and applicable.”249 For infrequent decisions, a teachable moment
could include the time leading up to the decisions, when people have overcome inertia,
are most motivated to learn, have weak pre-existing preferences, and are most likely to
integrate their new learning into their existing knowledge. A teachable moment might be
when a consumer is buying a first house, obtaining a first credit card, or deciding how to
manage money when first earning it. For habitual financial behaviors, such as
“overspending” or allowing inertia to take its course (e.g., not budgeting, not signing up
for a 401(k)), particular events can cue a teachable moment. A “cueing event” is one that
“(1) increases perceptions of personal risk and outcome expectancies, (2) prompts strong
affective or emotional responses, [or] (3) redefines self-concept or social role.”250 Close
experience with bankruptcy, foreclosure, or the like can increase perceived probability
and costs of poor outcomes, motivating behavior change. On the flip side, an event that
substantially increases financial resources might prompt a sense of new financial selfefficacy and increase receptivity to learning. Role changes such as becoming part of a
couple, having children, or becoming divorced can cue a teachable moment if consumers
perceive their responsibility for financial management to increase.251
Applying teachable moments theory to financial literacy education seems intuitively
sound, but, as discussed above, consumers who participate in financial literacy programs
at teachable moments do not appear to become any more financially literate. “Teachable
moments” might be merely “reachable” moments. That is, when consumers are facing a
new financial decision, have experienced a bad financial outcome, or have changed social
roles in ways that make them feel more responsible for financial matters, they are more
willing to take part in personal finance programs. At these times, consumers may be
more “reachable,” but may not be any more likely to learn about personal finance.
Ironically, to the extent that consumers are open to trying to learn, these “teachable
moments” are also vulnerable moments. When making everyday purchases, people are
likely to have well-defined preferences (e.g., preferring chocolate to vanilla) or welldeveloped decision strategies (e.g., choose the most energy-efficient product) honed over
247
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repeated experiences with near-term outcomes.
Few such preferences and
decisionmaking strategies exist in the personal finance realm, because major financial
decisions are infrequent, the consequences of past choices and strategies are murky, and
the products and market players are likely to have changed dramatically since consumers’
prior decisions. Few consumers have a clear idea of how much they want to save for
retirement or a developed strategy about how to allocate it among investments.252 Few
know how much and what type of life insurance policy they want, or even what choices
exist in the market. Because many consumers develop preferences and strategies during
the decision process, their choices can be influenced by those who seek to help them or
those who seek to exploit them.253
The question is who will reach consumers at these vulnerable teachable moments—
educators or the financial services industry? Given resource advantages, in the vast
majority of cases it will be the latter.
Educator claims that their “[t]argeted promotion and marketing efforts” can “create
teachable moments”254 are implausible. Over the course of a seven-year $20 million
national television and radio public service campaign waged recently to encourage
consumers to save more, personal savings declined from 4.7 percent to negative 2.0
percent.255 Public education campaigns can even harden attitudes against the information
conveyed.256 Voluntary financial education is widely available, yet seldom used.257
College students receiving their first credit card are in a potentially “teachable” moment,
but when 78,000 of these new cardholders were offered a 60-minute phone card to
complete an online financial course, only 6.6 percent did so.258
When the government acts as educator, it has some additional means at its disposal to
reach people. For example, to encourage retirement savings, since 2000 the U.S.
government has sent all adults an annual statement regarding how much they should
expect to receive from the program, given their federal paycheck deductions to date.
However, only 66 percent of adults in a national survey remembered receiving this
statement, let alone its contents.259 A number of states require personal finance education
in the public schools.260 However, as explained above, this education has not been
noticeably effective. Some states have begun requiring “credit counseling” as a condition
of consumer purchase of a high-priced mortgage.261 But, as explained previously,
counseling in this context is unlikely to be educational. The required attendance at a
personal finance class prior to bankruptcy discharge, noted above, is also in keeping with
252
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the “cueing events” theory. The efficacy of these classes is in considerable doubt; as
explained above, a prior bankruptcy debtor education program was found to have a small
but statistically significant negative effect on consumer outcomes. Forced financial
literacy education thus does not look promising.
Against the marketing and sales efforts of the financial services industry, education
provided by nonprofits and the government has no chance. The odds are tremendously
greater that industry, and not educators, will reach consumers when they are in teachable
vulnerable moments. The insurance industry is projected to spend $980 million in
advertising to consumers on the internet in 2007, and the consumer investment and credit
industries combined are projected to spend more than twice that much.262 Credit card
issuers spent $7.9 billion on sending 8 billion solicitations to American families in
2006—over 70 per household.263 Mortgage lenders have spent over $3 billion since 2000
on television, radio, and print media advertising.264 Mortgage and insurance brokers
spend tremendous resources approaching consumers in person to sell their products. The
director of one community organization that provides financial education has testified:
… We have tried a number of efforts to copy what [home mortgage] predators
do…. You can buy lists of recently divorced people, so we have done mailings to
those folks. We have used automated dialers…. You have to keep doing this time
after time, month after month…. We once had a subprime lender tell us … if you
take their total marketing and outreach and apportion [it] to loans closed, it's
about $1,500 apiece. We can't compete with that.265
The Defense Department recently concluded its mandatory financial education programs
provide little defense against poor credit decisions by service members:
Although the Department of Defense provides extensive financial training, a
significant number of Service members … still fall victim to easy credit widely
available around bases or online. Education does not trump the marketing of
these loans and the easy availability of quick cash with few questions asked.266
Financial services firms have little economic incentive to provide effective financial
literacy education. A seller of an easily-understood product that is better in quality or
price than competitors’ products has an incentive to educate consumers so as to increase
market share. But this sales strategy does not work in the financial products market
because the products are largely interchangeable—other sellers could offer the same
quality product at the same price and reap the benefits of the education without paying
the costs. Financial education is thus a classic public good. If one firm were to provide
financial education to consumers, those consumers would not be required to give the
teaching firm their business. Instead, they could—and with their newfound education
theoretically should—go to rival firms that, not having spent their resources on education,
would have lower costs of production and could, therefore, undercut the loan price
demanded by the teaching firm. Furthermore, as explained above, firms profit from poor
262
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financial literacy. Far cheaper means exist for grabbing market share than attempting
effective financial literacy education.
Financial literacy advocates believe that with better marketing they could educate
consumers at “teachable” moments through the same methods firms use to sell to
consumers at these vulnerable moments. But selling a product requires only that
consumers be convinced to buy it, not that they understand it. The seller does not care
which cognitive or emotional route the consumer follows to get to the product and
therefore can use an array of strategies. In one-on-one selling, as explained above, the
salesperson can ascertain which biases the consumer is vulnerable to by trying a variety
of sales tactics. One advertisement can play to pro-risk, optimism bias to encourage use
of credit card debt by some consumers (“Life Takes Risk. Life Takes VISA®”) and
another can play to anxiety or risk-aversion biases to encourage use of credit card debt by
other consumers (“With VISA®, You’re Protected.”).267 Ads reach consumer segments
through targeted marketing channels tailored to exploit behavioral tendencies. One
marketing company uses a vast database of “household level consumer financial
behavior” to model the behavior of fifty market segments and then classifies every
household in America at the “ZIP+4 level … as few as five to ten households.” To steer
financial product sellers right to the individual consumer, the models are designed to
work with data from the three credit repository companies.268
Finally, a seller only needs to convince a consumer to buy a product at a single
moment in time, whereas financial education must keep consumers out of trouble all the
time. Once a consumer purchases a financial product, penalties, sunk costs, and
motivated reasoning kick in, and so any biases the seller must overcome or exploit need
only be addressed briefly.269 Financial literacy programs must educate consumers out of
their self-defeating biases on a continuous basis, every day, in every situation. But
financial literacy education appears to have a very short shelf life. Even consumers who
have completed home buyer education can subsequently be “won over by the marketing
pitches of subprime lenders.”270 In the contest to reach consumers at teachable vulnerable
moments, the deck is stacked in favor of the financial services industry.
*
*
*
*
*
Given the foregoing, the failure to find any empirical evidence that the financial
literacy education model works is not surprising. In light of the velocity of change in the
consumer credit, insurance, and investment marketplace, the innumeracy of much of the
population, the prevalence of decisionmaking biases, and the financial advantage held by
sellers of financial products, financial literacy education should not be expected to work.
IV. THE COSTS OF FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION
As explained thus far, financial literacy education is not demonstrably effective, and
probably never will be an effective solution to consumer finance problems. One reaction
might be to ask, even if this education will never be effective, what is the harm in trying?
The following sets forth some answers to that question.
A. Paradoxical Effects on Consumer Decisionmaking
A surprising amount of empirical evidence implies that literacy and education can
have paradoxical effects—lowering performance on financial tests and increasing
267
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welfare-impairing financial behaviors. Yet the belief that financial literacy education is
effective runs so deep, even well-respected researchers who discover contrary evidence
repeatedly misinterpret it as providing support for the value of the education.
For example, the National Association of Securities Dealers found elderly consumer
fraud victims to be more financially literate, on average, than elderly nonvictims:
A major hypothesis going into the survey was that investment fraud victims do
not know as much about investing concepts as non-victims and would therefore
score lower on financial literacy questions. In fact, the study found the exact
opposite: investment fraud victims scored higher than non-victims on eight
financial literacy questions.271
Rather than the conclusion supported by the data, that financial literacy is positively
associated with the incidence of fraud, the study asserts “[t]his finding suggests that
financial literacy programs are necessary but probably not sufficient to prevent fraud.”272
A survey commissioned by the State of Washington to study the financial literacy of
victims of predatory home lending shows the same pattern. The study tested borrowers
who had taken loans from a predatory home lender against a general population sample.
As compared to the general population, the predatory lending victims knew more about
home mortgages, but less about investments. The author surmises that the group who had
taken loans with the predatory lender had “lower financial knowledge” and would benefit
from a literacy program.273 But if these borrowers are already more knowledgeable about
mortgages, teaching them more is unlikely to protect them. The results probably reflect
financial literacy gained by victims through the “school of hard knocks,” but tell us
nothing about how literacy affects the likelihood of victimization.
Studies of education over a longer period of time show no better results. In one,
eighteen months of participation in credit counseling had no effect on financial behaviors.
The authors admit that “a short-term credit counseling experience and some financial
education” is unlikely to improve financial behaviors, but assert without support that
credit counseling “can be most effective when there is continuing counseling and
education to improve individuals’ financial behaviors.”274 Another study comparing
bankruptcy debtors who received financial training with those who did not found, once
controls for other differences between the groups were added, the training to have a small
negative effect on outcomes.275 Data from the Jump$tart nationwide survey of high
school seniors has consistently shown that financial education does not increase financial
knowledge among high school students and that students who take a semester-long
personal finance course “tend to do a little worse … than those who do not.”276
None of these results demonstrate that financial literacy education produces poor
decisions. But that more education could lead to worse financial behavior is not
implausible. Emphasizing the importance of financial literacy may backfire by
increasing the stakes and thus, as explained above, mistakes. Because education alerts
consumers to the availability of even more financial information and choices, it could
271
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increase information overload, choice overload, and the illusion of knowledge, and
thereby decrease decision quality.
Financial literacy programs are not only premised on the idea that consumers can
277
control their financial situation, but promote this belief through their curricula.
In
reality, this education may do no more than increase overoptimism and the illusion of
being able to control financial risks. Participants in these programs consistently selfassess as having learned a great deal and having gained confidence,278 but their poor
performance on literacy exams indicates that their confidence is misplaced. For example,
when well-educated consumers approaching retirement age were given three to five hours
of financial training in one-on-one or small group settings, they became more confident
in their ability to handle their own retirement planning. However, their performance of
financial planning tasks did not improve at a statistically significant level; after the
training, they made errors equal to between four and seven years of retirement income.
The authors of the study conclude: “These … findings suggest that commercial financial
training seminars may do more harm than good—individuals may feel confident that the
quality of their financial planning efforts are sound, despite clear objective evidence to
the contrary.”279 With added confidence, consumers are more likely to make decisions
for which they lack sufficient expertise, rather than seeking professional financial advice.
Higher financial literacy itself can lead to overconfidence. The National Association
of Securities Dealers study finding fraud victims to be more financially literate also found
that the victims were more likely to agree with the statement “’I rely on my own
experience and knowledge to make financial decisions.’”280 Other studies have also
found that investor fraud victims have a higher than average internal locus of control,
meaning that they believe that they have a great deal of control over their own lives.281
However, confidence is not a measure of literacy; some of the least knowledgeable
consumers appear to be the most confident. Research shows that consumers with high
financial literacy exam scores generally correctly perceive their knowledge levels as high,
but those with lower literacy exam scores are significantly more confident in their own
knowledge than they should be.282 In the index fund investment study described above,
the MBAs who reported being “very knowledgeable” about investing made worse
investment decisions than all but the MBAs who were least confident.283 Similarly, high
school students who describe themselves as “very thrifty” have lower average financial
literacy scores, even on questions about saving.284 In another large sample of consumers,
half of the respondents who reported that their financial literacy was at the highest end of
the scale did not objectively test within the highest quartile of the sample, and over 15
percent were in the bottom quartile.285 As mentioned above, the portfolios of consumers
who are sufficiently confident in their investing acumen to trade frequently underperform the market by much more than the average investor.
277
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Another widespread problem appears to be consumer misinterpretation of the
material taught, leading to worse decisions. For example, some consumers taught to
diversify simply divide their retirement savings evenly over a menu of investment
choices, regardless of whether these investments are from the same sector.286 Even when
their choices are index funds holding approximately the same portfolio of stocks, many
will divide their investments evenly among the choices.287 In a number of studies, giving
consumers accurate statistical information about health risks led to increased
overoptimism.288 Apparently the information became more fodder for the bias.
Finally, inaccurate assumptions can occasionally lead to better outcomes than truth.
For example, knowledge about the quality of one’s own credit report and score is widely
believed to be crucial for personal financial literacy. Congress charged the Financial
Literacy and Education Commission with increasing consumer “awareness of the
availability and significance of credit reports and credit scores in obtaining credit, …
their effect on credit terms, and the effect common financial decisions may have on credit
scores.”289 However, borrowers who overestimate their creditworthiness as compared to
their credit scores appear to receive better prices on home mortgages than those whose
self-assessments are closer to their credit scores.290 Although this could reflect accurate
self-assessments of information not accounted for in credit scores, it could also be that
overconfidence about credit score leads to increased persistence in shopping and thus to
lower prices. A little bit of knowledge may not always be such a good thing.
B. Blaming the Consumer
Sean Moyer, … a National Merit Scholar, signed up for a credit card his
freshman year at the University of Texas. With a part-time job, he could afford
the debt on this card. But without his parents' knowledge, he accumulated a Visa,
two MasterCards, and nine other store and gas cards. His parents did not learn
that he owed $10,000 until he moved home to save money and work off his debts.
A week before his suicide in 1998, he told his mother that he had no idea how to
get out of his financial mess and did not see much of a future for himself.291
Financial literacy advocates, members of Congress, and academics have cited this
story, and others like it, as evidence in support of personal finance education.292 But is
ignorance of financial topics truly to blame for the suicides and myriad of other problems
suffered by over-indebted consumers?293 Or is the financial literacy policy model part of
the problem, not the solution?
The latter question should be taken seriously. As previously noted, American culture
has long viewed personal finance decisions as reflecting character traits of responsibility,
286
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trustworthiness, self-control, industry, frugality, and wisdom.294 Consumers are believed
to have sufficient control over their financial well-being through their decisions and
behavior to be held in moral disapprobation when they are experiencing poor financial
outcomes. Financial decisions are either “good” or “bad.” Financial behavior is either
“responsible” or “irresponsible,” “healthy” or “unhealthy.” Consumers with late
payments, like juveniles who commit crimes, are “delinquent.” Poor financial behavior
is seen by some as reflecting mental instability.295
Now that financial products are so complex and fluid that few can understand them
well, financial literacy education is a necessary detour on the path to moral
blameworthiness. Given the vagaries of the stock market, a consumer’s losing
investment strategy would be difficult to characterize as a direct result of her
irresponsibility, laziness, greed, or abject stupidity. But with the education model, she
can be blamed for failing to become sufficiently expert to handle her retirement savings.
Financial literacy education as a policy tool blames the consumer for her own plight, but
shifts from an indictment of raw moral character traits to the consumer’s “choice” about
whether to attend classes and use the information and skills purportedly taught.
The language used to talk about educating consumers to be financially literate is
replete with morally-charged language of responsibility and blame. For example, Freddie
Mac’s “CreditSmart” course asserts that “[g]ood credit terms and interest rates are
earned.”296 In fact, good credit terms and interest rates are largely a product of wealth,
and wealth is largely inherited, either directly or through educational and job
opportunities that wealth and class can buy. The materials define credit as:
The ability of a person to borrow money, or obtain goods with payments over
time, as a consequence of the favorable opinion held by a lender as to the
person's financial situation and reliability.297
But lenders do not lend on the basis of “favorable opinions” about consumers; they lend
because they believe they will make a profit from the transaction. One lending business
model is to seek out consumers who are unreliable in making regular payments and are,
therefore, likely candidates for incurring late fees, over-the-limit fees, and interest
charges at high default rates.298
Although many financial education classes are delivered in an encouraging and
understanding style, some promote a blame-the-consumer mentality. “’There’s right and
wrong—you owe it, you should pay it,’” as one bankruptcy trustee involved in debtor
education explains the philosophy.299 The arguably more financially savvy approach to
debt, however, is to weigh the costs and benefits of repayment; one study finding that
borrowers who had received counseling were more likely to default strategically (i.e.,
when their mortgages exceeded the values of their houses), explains that this behavior is
300
costlier for the lender but optimal for the borrower.
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Some programs take a “tough love” approach, teaching consumers to hold
themselves responsible for their financial circumstances as a piece with having
confidence in their financial self-efficacy. Materials in one of the courses that consumers
are required to take as a condition of discharge in bankruptcy state:
[C]onsumers can blame lenders if they want, and those that engage in these
practices should be blamed, but “... the fact is that if you are a victim, you have
no one to blame but yourself.”…
[A] lender is not doing anything illegal if it “... does all the right things and still
charges you interest rates and fees that are higher than you should be paying
given your credit history.” … [T]he lender is “... simply getting you to pay more
than you have to. It is no different than shopping for a car and paying more than
you would if you bothered to negotiate a lower price.”301
With its focus on the responsibility and efficacy of the individual consumer, the financial
literacy model absolves financial services firms and policymakers and deflects inquiry
302
away from systemic societal and market failures.
Another financial education program used prior to the new bankruptcy law aimed to
change debtor “attitudes toward irresponsible spending.”303 When academics attempted
to evaluate this program, those debtors who participated were less likely to respond to
follow-up surveys than control group debtors who did not receive the education. The
high participant nonresponse rate suggests that despite educators’ intentions to the
contrary, the program reinforced participants’ shame about their financial behaviors.
President Bush recently attributed the rising foreclosure rates of 2007 to consumer
failure to read the “fine print” on their mortgages, and concluded that “[t]here needs to be
financial education measures in place.”304 Defaulting mortgagors surveyed identify job
loss, other income reduction, injury and medical problems, home repairs, death in the
family, divorce, and credit card mismanagement,305 not failure to read loan documents or
lack of financial education, as the cause of their defaults. But financial services firms
know consumers fear that society will blame them for their plight. Numerous websites
offer to save consumers’ “dignity,”306 by helping them avoid the “stigma and public
humiliation” of foreclosure307 and preventing the “embarrassment of … foreclosure
information posted in the local newspaper for friends, family and co-workers to see.”308
Consumers understand the financial literacy education model of consumer protection
to mean that they have only themselves to blame for their financial woes.309 Stigma leads
them to keep their problems to themselves, rather than seeking help. As one consumer
said when explaining her reaction to discovering that a home mortgage lender had slipped
a 26 percent origination fee into her loan at closing: “I felt so stupid . . . I couldn’t tell
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anybody.”310 The Defense Department’s credit counseling program is confidential so that
service members will not be deterred from participation by public embarrassment or fear
that superiors will treat credit problems as evidence of unworthiness for career
advancement.311 Even when financial literacy is irrelevant, the education model makes
consumers feel disgraced by poor financial outcomes. One consumer who bought a
comprehensive health insurance policy, as any financial education course would have
suggested, developed cancer and was charged personally for thousands of dollars of
medical expenses her policy should have covered. She was driven into bankruptcy
through no fault of her own, but she still felt “devastated and embarrassed.”312
Many consumers who become delinquent on their home mortgage loans do not
contact their lender to try to work out some alternative payment plan. More than a third
of such consumers responding to one survey reported that the reason they did not contact
their lender was because they were embarrassed.313 The media deride “jingle mail”—
homeowners who can not afford their mortgages sending the house keys to the lender and
314
moving out—as evidence of insouciance toward homeownership—easy come, easy go.
But if that were true, jingle mail more often would be sent from investment properties,
not owner-occupied housing. Contacting the lender to arrange a short sale or deed-in-lieu
would be better than a foreclosure for homeowners’ credit reports, but shame leads them
to send jingle mail instead.
The reaction of the late Sean Moyer’s parents when he told them about his financial
problems reveals these cultural beliefs. Sean’s mother explained that when he told his
parents about his financial problems: “His father and I were appalled that he had gotten
into so much debt, but we didn't have an extra $10,000.”315 The “appall” is at the
consumer, not at the creditor for extending a full-time college student, without rich
parents to support him, $10,000 in credit. Through the lens of the education model, every
consumer financial problem looks like the result of poor decisions by the consumer.
Societal approbation and shame are not only consequences of poor financial straits,
they also contribute to poor financial decisions. Although very brief cash-flow problems
might be handled wisely using credit cards, Americans are known to try to hide
unemployment or other serious, long-term financial woes by keeping themselves afloat
on credit card debt that can quickly snowball through high interest rates.316
This blame is socially pernicious for a number of reasons. First, it provides a
convenient excuse for society to refrain from assisting consumers who are experiencing
poor financial outcomes.317 As a community affairs officer involved in a financial
education program put it:
310
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What is driving this financial education movement?… Is it the poverty gap in this
country?… [W]hat we’re asking people … who make $20,000 or less is: “Absent
us raising your wages in this country, we’re asking you to build wealth… We’re
asking you to save the little amount of money you’re making. We’re asking you
to reduce your debt burden, learn how to manage your money, and clean up your
credit history with the little amount of money you’re working with.”318
The financial literacy policy model is also socially pernicious because even as it
blames lower wealth consumers and their communities for their financial plight, any
benefits of financial education are likely to flow disproportionately to higher wealth
consumers. Although supporters claim commitment to the ideal that financial literacy
education will raise all boats, middle and high income children have learning
environments more likely to teach financial skills effectively.319 As public schools have
begun offering, and even requiring, personal finance classes, Jump$tart has reported an
overall decline in literacy, but an increase for socially-advantaged subgroups.320 Those
with more income and wealth to begin with can increase their wealth through financial
strategies because they have sufficient resources to take high risk-high reward gambles
while maintaining a personal safety net.
Even when they are not the population targeted, where a personal finance program is
available to all, higher income consumers more frequently enroll in and finish it than
lower income consumers. For example, people voluntarily attending an all-day financial
education conference sponsored by Money 2000, a federal savings education program,
had more income and more education than the national averages.321 When credit card
companies offered online education programs to college students, those who participated
were wealthier, more educated, and more creditworthy, on average, than the students who
declined to take the course.322 One study of nonprofit agency personnel who learned to
teach financial skills suggested that teachers gained more from the program than students
because the teachers’ prior financial problems were due to a lack of financial
management skills, whereas the students’ were due to poverty.323
At the same time, even if—and especially if—financial literacy education is largely
324
ineffective, higher income groups do not need to suffer from their ignorance.
They
have resources to hire professional experts such as investment advisors and financial
planners to make financial decisions for them. The financial education model
paradoxically requires those least equipped for the task to make a host of personal
financial decisions, and credits those with higher incomes with “responsible financial
behavior” even when they hire professionals to manage their financial decisions for them.
When higher socioeconomic level consumers find themselves in financial difficulty,
the assumption that consumers are to blame for their financial problems does not always
follow. Tellingly, while blaming consumers facing foreclosure for failing to read their
loan documents, the President never mentioned that investors in mortgage-backed
securities had failed to read the prospectuses for the billion dollars of mortgage backed
securities they bought. These prospectuses provide clear warning to investors about the
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risk of foreclosure, even as the borrowers themselves were not warned.325 The financial
educations of investors probably would have helped them understand the warnings in the
prospectuses, but their MBAs did not make them any more likely to read or heed them.
C. Time, Expense, and Inefficient Division of Labor
Even if the barriers described above could be overcome, the costs in time, effort, and
expense of widely effective financial education would be enormous. In the context of
home ownership education and counseling, but applicable to financial literacy programs
more broadly, a recent review remarks: “A system that imposes itself to the extent that
[this] does on the lives of its beneficiaries should be able to show in compelling fashion
that the benefits it provides are commensurate with the level of intrusion and the time and
energy devoted by both counselors and participants.”326 Given the meager plausible
returns on financial education, current resources devoted to the project waste millions of
hours and dollars every year.327 Yet, given the magnitude of what the education policy
model aims to achieve, these hours and dollars are pitifully few.
Nonprofits that fund and operate financial literacy programs range from national
organizations to small local groups. The most well-established is the National Council on
Economic Education (NCEE), founded in 1949 with a mission to bring personal finance
education to teachers and students.328 In 2005, NCEE spent $ 3.5 million directly on its
domestic programs.329 Although $3.5 million is a significant sum, it equates to only $50
per school, 50¢ per student, and $30 per teacher reached. NCEE’s financial fitness for
life program is taught in 15 to 22 classroom lessons,330 time diverted from other subjects.
The federal government promotes financial literacy directly through developing and
disseminating educational materials, and distributes millions of grant dollars to fund
private-sector financial literacy programs.331 The states promote it primarily through the
schools. Personal financial literacy education for public school students is mandatory in
some states and school districts and elective in others.332 Missouri, which requires all
high school students to take a personal finance course, pegs the cost in teacher time at
approximately $65.6 million annually, in addition to the cost in student time that would
otherwise be spent on other subjects, the cost of materials, and administrative overhead
such as classroom expenses.333
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Under certain circumstances, adults may also be required to take a financial
education course. In 2006, consumers spent approximately three million hours and $100
million on credit counseling required to file for bankruptcy and financial education
required to receive a discharge, three hours and $100 per debtor.334 In an effort to
circumvent predatory home lending, some states now require education or counseling as
a condition of taking on a high-cost loan. For example, Georgia’s Fair Lending Act
requires consumers to complete counseling before they can receive a high-cost loan.335
Typically, the counseling requirement is satisfied by a free, two-hour one-on-one session,
although some programs involve a series of group classes.336
Many financial literacy education programs do not charge a fee, but participants must
spend hours in classes, doing homework, traveling to and from the program, etc.
Different programs take widely varying amounts of class and homework time. The
Department of Agriculture’s Financial Security in Later Life program provides a free,
online self-study course which takes only one and a half hours to complete.337 The
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation’s Money Smart program for adults consists of ten
modules, each of which takes one or two hours of classroom time.338
Similar to the reasons for not hiring an expert financial advisor explained above, lack
of resources and information can lead to a rational decision not to participate in voluntary
financial literacy programs. Before attending a class, a consumer has little means to
determine whether its benefits will outweigh its costs. The literacy programs that
advocate increasing savings or homeownership warrant skepticism, given evidence that
for low-income families, reducing current consumption to accumulate savings may do
more harm than good and moving from renting to homeownership may place them in
339
Opportunity costs of attending “free” personal
poorer neighborhood conditions.
finance programs are highest for those who have the least money and time to spare, and
so they are likely to choose to use that time to work more hours to meet financial
needs.340 Participation in voluntary programs, unless high school credit, a lower
341
mortgage interest rate, or some other perk is awarded, is therefore predictably low.
The foregoing describes the quantity of time and money spent on programs today;
effective financial literacy education, if it were possible, would require exponentially
greater resources. The consensus of those who have taken a hard look at the field is that
only long-term, individually-tailored and responsive programs delivered in small
classrooms and one-on-one settings might possibly be effective. A Freddie Mac study
found home loan education delivered through a series of in-person classes had positive
effects, but self-study and telephone counseling were ineffective.342 A Federal Reserve
Board Bulletin article surveys the many “challenges for policymakers and educators in
designing and delivering financial literacy education to meet the needs of all groups” and
concludes that “in an ideal world, financial educators would analyze each individual’s
334
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needs and provide customized training based on that assessment.” But, the authors admit,
“such one-on-one interaction is time- and resource-intensive.”343
One-on-one “education” is not only wildly expensive, it also undermines the case for
financial literacy education. The likely reason one-on-one “education”—commonly
called counseling or advice—is “effective” is not because it increases financial literacy,
but rather because, as explained above, the counselor intervenes on behalf of the
consumer or provides specific instructions the consumer can follow without being
financially literate. In effect, one-on-one “financial literacy education” is really
individualized expert advice, equivalent to providing every consumer with a financial
planner. If society is willing to pay for this time- and resource-intensive “education,” it
would be better to call it personal financial advice, and avoid the other costs of the
financial literacy education model.
Even if every consumer could become her own expert financial advisor, providing
consumers free financial advisors would be far less expensive.344 Human capital
resources are most efficiently used when, to some optimal degree, people perform those
tasks for which they are best suited, whether through training or predilection. Consumers
generally do not serve as their own doctors and lawyers and for reasons of efficient
division of labor alone, generally should not serve as their own financial experts. The
decision of consumers with sufficient means to rely on financial advisors is rational and
efficient.345 Consumers with less means might also be acting rationally in deciding not to
346
The gargantuan amount of time and effort
attempt to become financially literate.
necessary for a consumer of average financial literacy to become her own financial expert
might yield a lower return when invested in financial education rather than gainful
employment.
D. Regulatory Opportunity Costs
The pursuit of financial literacy education has opportunity costs, and not only in the
time, money, attention, and effort of consumers and teachers directly involved.
Government authorities frequently pull financial literacy education out of their
policymaking, regulatory, and enforcement toolboxes. Using this tool can become an
excuse for not engaging in the practically formidable task of developing procedural
regulation that would effectively match products in the fast-moving financial market with
the consumers for which they are appropriate. Rather than offering regulations that
would be effective on their own, Governor Mishkin recently explained that the Federal
Reserve Board supports financial literacy programs because “[i]mproving consumers’

economic decision making will enhance the effectiveness of new rules and
regulations.”347 This tool also side-steps the politically formidable task of enacting
substantive regulation likely to make many consumers better off but at the price of
making some consumers and much of industry worse off. Financial literacy education
creates the illusion of regulation without the costs of regulation.
Counterfactuals are only speculative, but a look at how policymakers have reacted to
news of problematic consumer financial products is instructive. For example, when the
marketing of expensive life insurance policies that would provide few, if any, benefits to
343
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servicemembers leaving for the Iraq war was publicized, Senators Hillary Clinton and
Susan Collins quickly sponsored bipartisan legislation not outlawing these welfaredecreasing policies, but providing servicemembers with financial education and
counseling.348 Even when substantive reform legislation is introduced, it languishes in
subcommittee while financial literacy initiatives sail through. In 2003, for example, bills
proposing consumer financial services reforms, from protecting homebuyers from
predatory mortgage lending practices349 to capping payday loans at 36 percent,350 were
introduced and referred to subcommittee, but none received a hearing. Conversely, the
bill establishing the Financial Literacy and Education Commission moved through both
houses to become law in less than three months, including Congress’s August recess.351
Promoting financial literacy is politically expedient, allowing legislators to both
please the financial services industry and campaign as protectors of consumers. One bill
regarding home-mortgage escrow accounts tells a story of the watering-down of
substantive regulation into consumer protection though educational information. These
accounts are monies collected from borrowers by lenders to pay periodic bills for taxes
and insurance. In the late 1980s, it came to light that lenders were overcharging
borrowers, holding far larger amounts than necessary for escrow, and then keeping the
interest earned on the accounts. When Congressman Charles Bennett, then “Congress’
leading advocate of tough new consumer protection against lender abuses in home
mortgage escrow accounts”352 first introduced legislation on the topic, it included
substantive provisions prohibiting overcharges and requiring lenders to pay consumers
interest on their escrow balances. But after the banking industry lobbied against the bill,
Bennett introduced a version requiring only that consumers be given an annual
explanation of inflows and outflows from escrow accounts, to educate them about
potential problems.353 The Mortgage Bankers Association of American promptly
endorsed the new bill, and the Congressman could report back to his constituents that he
was sponsoring legislation to protect them.
Regulator reliance on financial literacy education also may come at the cost of
effective regulation. For example, one product that has been on the market for at least a
decade is the fee-harvesting credit card. These cards carry fees that dwarf the credit they
provide, making them financially welfare-decreasing for most if not all consumers. One
VISA card with a $300 credit limit, for example, requires payment of a $79 application
fee, and then, once the card is approved, $281 in fees are charged to the account. In sum,
consumers pay $360 and have a credit line of $19 when they receive the card.354 Because
few consumers read the fine print, they are unaware how little credit they have and soon
rack up over-the-limit fees.355 The business model is lucrative; one issuer charged $444
million in fees on these cards in 2006 and made a net profit of $107 million. Although
the issuer charged off $728 million consumers never paid, these debts were mostly the
issuer’s own fees on cards consumers received and then thought better of using.356 The
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federal government’s response has been to publish consumer education materials, rather
than banning these cards.357
Financial literacy education programs have also become a popular component of
litigation settlements between firms and government enforcement agencies. Funding for
these programs has been accepted as consideration in exchange for settlement in cases
alleging discriminatory mortgage lending, fraudulent student loans, deceptive insurance
sale tactics, predatory mortgage lending, fraudulent investment advice, etc.358 Again,
counterfactuals are speculative, but the consumer welfare returns on these literacy
programs might well be lower than the returns that would be generated by using the
defendants’ expertise to help develop and/or the defendants’ businesses to experimentally
test potential new procedural or substantive regulations. So too, regulator acceptance of
firm sponsorship of financial literacy programs for purposes of meeting obligations under
the Community Reinvestment Act, analogous state laws, or state licensing schemes,359
comes at the price of other activities that the credit, insurance, and investment industries
could be doing to improve consumer welfare in personal finance transactions.
V. CONCLUSION
Financial education can be compared to a road map to the American Dream. I
believe that we need to teach all Americans the necessary tools to read that map,
so that they can reach the Dream.
— Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill360
The financial literacy education policy model locates the problem of and solution to
poor financial outcomes in the consumer, but these might as easily be conceptualized as
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part of the “choice architecture”361 of consumer financial decisions. Nothing is inherently
wrong with either consumers or the modern, complex, and ever-changing financial
services marketplace, but the interaction between the two creates welfare-impairing
outcomes. Potential general approaches to improve that interaction include enhancing the
resources with which consumers approach the market, changing the financial decision
environment, or bringing seller incentives in line with consumer incentives. For
example:
1. Affordable Expert Advice.362 One way to increase the resources with which
consumers face the market would be to establish a system of trustworthy expert
intermediaries to advise consumers on welfare-enhancing financial products and services,
akin to pro bono legal advice. Affordable expert advice might be provided through a
publicly-funded, accessible system of neutral financially-trained intermediaries who
would advise consumers on financial products and services. Expert financial advice not
only would allow consumers to piggyback off of the financial literacy of a professional,
creating the societal efficiencies inherent in specialization, but also would reduce
consumer anxiety about making financial decisions on their own, alleviating stress and
freeing up more mental resources to use to make the decisions well. Expert advice would
narrow the choice set presented to individual consumers, simultaneously conserving
consumer decisionmaking resources.
Certainly subsidized experts would be costly to the public fisc, and either adding a
new intermediary or professionalizing the financial product sales force will add costs to
all sales transactions. Yet these measures might well be less expensive than even
theoretically effective universal financial literacy education.
2. Welfare-Enhancing Defaults.363 Defaults could be set such that when consumers
fail to make personal financial decisions, the retirement, credit, and insurance positions
they are left in would be welfare-enhancing for the average consumer. For example, as
now permitted but not required by the Pension Protection Act of 2006,364 default rules
could place consumers into relatively high retirement savings rates to exploit consumer
procrastination in financial planning, one of the effects of mental discounting of tangible
costs and benefits over time and uncertainty.
Strong defaults, although not a formal denial of choice, would burden consumer
choice with the costs of opting out, but today’s market-set defaults pose the same burden.
Welfare-enhancing defaults as opposed to market-set defaults would be more likely to
further autonomy, however, because the market will always have an incentive to set
defaults that transfer wealth from consumers to sellers, and a decrease in wealth
diminishes autonomy.
3. True Transparency.365 Financial products could be changed so as to make it
easier for consumers to choose among them well. True transparency would require
simplifying the financial products available so that costs and benefits would be clear to
consumers, despite their decisionmaking biases and low financial literacy levels. The
variety, complexity, and sheer number of products available in the marketplace would
361
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need to be reduced. Personal finance education in such a context might be useful,
because it does appear that most people can be effectively taught rules-of-thumb. If the
products were structured such that a consumer would be able to apply the rule of thumb
correctly, the resulting decisions could be good ones. Simplifying the market this way
would not be a solution—consumers who do not understand the reasoning behind the rule
might be fairly easily swayed by salespeople and their own biases to abandon it—but
simplification would be an improvement.
Limiting the ways in which credit arrangements, insurance plans, or investment
vehicles could be structured would avoid information and choice overload, giving
consumers a realistic opportunity to compare the costs and benefits of the available
options. This intervention in the market would reduce consumer choice, yet only
decisions made under transparent conditions can be truly autonomous. Moreover, price,
term, and quality competition among sellers can only be effectuated by consumers who
understand the products’ prices, terms, and quality well enough to comparison shop.
Absent competition, the market inevitably will function inefficiently.
4. Aligning Incentives.366 There are a number of ways in which the incentives of
sellers of consumer financial products might be brought into closer alignment with
consumers’ best interests. For example, sellers might be charged with fiduciary duties to
consumers, enforceable through a licensing scheme requiring sellers to be bonded or
insured in amounts that might depend on claims history. To prevent conflicts of interest
between consumers and salespeople, the latter’s salaries might be paid on a flat fee basis.
Sellers of investments might be given an interest in the investor’s long term well-being
through price structures that reflect investment performance over time. The incentives of
mortgage sellers, investors, and servicers might be changed by banning prepayment
penalties and up-front fees that inhibit borrowers from refinancing with other lenders,
allowing borrowers to select their own loan servicers, requiring sellers or holders to
compensate communities for the externalities of foreclosure, and abrogating the holderin-due course doctrine. Insurer incentives might be moved toward insureds’ interests by
requiring insurers to maintain high policy member satisfaction ratings to continue doing
business in a state from year to year.
Incentives might be aligned through detailed regulations tailored for particular
products and sales channels or through a broad standard requiring industry to determine
how to align incentives. Whether the government could keep up with the market well
enough to keep such incentives in place through detailed regulations, and whether
consumers could cost-effectively enforce a broad standard, are both open questions. But
current vague, difficult-to-enforce fiduciary duties on financial product sellers have not
truly tested the potential for aligning incentives.
5. Products Liability.367 Seller actions that harm consumer financial welfare could
be deterred by imposing liability on sellers when their products cause consumer injury.
Financial products, like other consumer products, could be governed by a negligence
standard, leaving courts to decide whether the burden of preventing financial injury to the
consumer exceeds the magnitude of that injury multiplied by its likelihood of occurring.
Strict liability might be imposed on providers of financial products when their products’
defects cause consumer injury.
Under this policy model, causation would be difficult to prove, given the host of
contributors to any consumer financial injury, but pure comparative negligence principles
might be tweaked to limit firms’ liability to their proportionate contribution to the
damages. This policy response also depends on the ability of consumers to bring actions
366
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cost-effectively (perhaps through attorney fees provisions) and often at a time when the
consumer is already overwhelmed by financial distress. But products liability principles
might prove easier for courts to apply than vague fiduciary duties.
6. Self-Control Devices.368 Another possibility is to create more devices through
which consumers could control their own to future financial actions, thereby avoiding the
effects of time-bias and perhaps protecting themselves against future decisions that might
otherwise be made under the influence of stress or persuasive sales tactics. Many such
devices already exist—consumers commit to life-insurance and long-term-care insurance
policies by putting all their past contributions to these policies at risk if they stop making
payments, they have their employers over-withhold taxes, they cut up their credit cards or
freeze them in ice, they budget and use savings vehicles that are costly to open (CDs,
retirement funds, home equity build-up, piggybanks that must be broken to open), etc. Of
course, these devices are optional, and consumers can usually evade their own prior
commitments, at a price.
Regulation currently assists or incentivizes consumers to use some of these devices.
For example, taxes on retirement funds and home equity savings are deferred and the
government collects and distributes over-withheld taxes. But policymakers might design
and make available more of these devices to more consumers. For example, rather than
giving consumers, particularly those with no other source of income, social security and
disability payments in monthly lump sums, the social security administration could pay
landlords and utility companies directly with the remainder distributed to beneficiaries on
a weekly basis. More generally, the government might create systems through which
income flows from employment or pensions more closely matched expense flows for rent
or mortgage payments, utility payments, etc. To the extent that funds could be directly
moved from income sources to expense creditors, the transaction costs of going through
individuals’ accounts would be reduced, although to the extent that income sources or
expense creditors would need to engage in more transactions, their costs would increase.
It appears that little attention has been paid to how regulation might provide consumers
with self-control devices, so much more thinking needs to be done here.
7. Substantive Regulation.369 Prohibiting the sale of financial products with
particular risky or outright harmful components would reduce consumer choice most
directly. Because even the most esoteric of financial product structures have some
consumers for whom they are appropriate, the cost of that reduced choice would be borne
by these consumers. Nevertheless, a marketplace of substantively unregulated financial
products also has a price, one currently borne by those consumers who receive financial
products that are inappropriate for their needs, and, in some instances, borne by these
consumers’ communities. Even consumers who purchase good financial products today
would be spared the cost of searching through the multitude of poor products currently on
the market if substantive regulation were employed.
Each of these approaches would limit “consumer choice” in some respect, yet
enhance both consumer financial outcomes and functional autonomy, in terms of
reflecting the consumer’s own goals and values and providing the consumer with a sense
of personal control over her decisions, actions, environment, and life path. These limits
on individual choice present the central paradox of the ownership society in the modern
marketplace of consumer financial services: to enhance true consumer autonomy, to give
consumers more ownership and control over their own daily lives and ultimate destinies,
368

See, e.g., Thaler & Benartzi, supra note__[Eds: Save More]; Kurt Eggert, Lashed to the Mast and Crying
for Help: How Self-Limitation of Autonomy Can Protect Elders from Predatory Lending, 36 LOY. L.A. L.
REV. 693 (2003).
369
E.g., Kathleen C. Engel & Patricia A. McCoy, A Tale of Three Markets: The Law and Economics of
Predatory Lending, 80 TEX. L. REV. 1255, 1260 (May 2002) (proposing suitability requirement for home
mortgages); Elizabeth Warren, Unsafe at Any Rate, 5 DEMOCRACY 1 (2007).

WILLIS

AGAINST FINANCIAL LITERACY EDUCATION – 3/20/08 DRAFT

56

requires regulatory interventions in that marketplace that limit formal choice. To
ultimately have true control over their lives, consumers need to have less formal control
over some decisions in their lives.
The failed social policy of financial literacy education denies this paradox, and
diverts attention from more creative approaches to improve consumer financial
transactions. The challenge now is to develop and implement policies and legal rules that
will reshape the consumer financial services market into a landscape conducive to good
consumer decisions and outcomes. Such regulatory interventions must navigate the
heterogeneity of consumer knowledge, skills, and behavioral traits, taking care not hinder
marketplace changes that would enhance consumer welfare. To be successful, each legal
intervention will undoubtedly need to be both context-specific and amenable to change as
the market evolves. This is a delicate, challenging, time-intensive and costly task,
requiring requisition of the resources currently spent on financial education and more.
In an idealized first-best world, where all people are far above average, education
would train every consumer to be financially literate and would motivate every consumer
to use that literacy to make good choices. The costs of the education model would be low
enough and the benefits high enough that empowered citizens of the ownership society
could flourish, and more rather than less education would be desirable. Unfortunately,
such an education is not possible, or, if it were possible, the price of such an education
would be so high as to reduce social welfare. In the real, second-best world, less rather
than more financial literacy education may be better.370
The financial literacy education model is premised on the promise of consumer
sovereignty, that consumers can be taught to make welfare-enhancing choices in the
insurance, credit, and investment marketplace, trained to read and travel “the road map to
the American Dream.” Ironically, the model ensures instead the sovereignty of the
market. Overtly, the model is an attempt at social engineering, trying to change not only
consumers’ skills, but their thought processes, feelings, motivations, and ultimately their
values. In the world that financial literacy education advocates, consumers are but wealth
maximizers, looking out for their own financial interests rather than shared societal and
civic goals. Covertly, the model dupes consumers into thinking they can master the
financial services market, while placing blame upon them for their failure to do so,
deflecting political pressure for change. But changing the personal finance market or the
manner in which consumers must maneuver in it—making the map easier to read and
follow, giving them a guide, or building more direct routes to the American Dream—is
likely to be more efficacious, and at a lower cost. Consumers can make welfareenhancing choices, but to be truly autonomous, those choices must be made in a context
that consumers can navigate.
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